CLIMATE JUSTICE AND POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Lessons from the Asia-Pacific Region
PRINCIPAL AUTHORS

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The conceptual frame it provides yields a good analyses of positive feedback and adverse trade-offs among different SDGs as well as between the SDGs and other development objectives including climate action. It can also contribute to addressing the immense and immeasurable loss and damage that humanity is witnessing around the world, and particularly in the global south. We are confident that lower and middle income countries will expedite their efforts towards the achievement of the SDGs if they pursue both the spirit and practice of policy coherence and sustainable development. However, no one country or one region can be truly sustainable or reverse the climate crisis unless all the countries are working towards achieving these outcomes. Considerations of justice, equity, historical role and the need to create development space for less developed countries requires stronger integration of these values within the policy coherence for sustainable development frame of reference, and making therefore a truly transformational tool.

The present study is mainly based on the reflections of a variety of actors from Asia and the Pacific and gives us good insights into their perspectives, their roles and contributions, and the challenges and responses of governments in the region in ensuring policy coherence for sustainable development better in both the global north and the global south. The study underlines the need for more evidence-based research to facilitate the work, analysis and advocacy of civil society, particularly in Asia and the Pacific. It unambiguously calls for a stronger partnership between organized civil society across the world to create a more nuanced, shared, and critical understanding of policy coherence for sustainable development.

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The study defines the need for greater policy coherence between climate actions and the sustainable development goals at all levels, and across all areas of work. But the study is also honest enough to accept the difficulty and challenges of achieving policy coherence for sustainable development. While advocating for greater coherence, it is conscious of the obstacles to its achievement. It proposes that clear advocacy on PCSD should lead to much greater coherence. PCSD, as a principle, is conceptually very strong. But there is a risk that it exists purely at a theoretical level under the present circumstances where the neoliberal paradigm dominates the global political economy. Most stakeholders can commit to PCSD. But the people and planet need more than a commitment; achieving PCSD requires action.

I agree with the general findings of the study that policy coherence for sustainable development can only be discerned in a rudimentary form across the Asia Pacific region, as evidenced by the country studies. But it can be properly achieved under the common or overarching principle of partnership, cooperation, and solidarity for people's rights and development.

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In 2021, the Finnish National Commission on Sustainable Development drew up a national 2030 Agenda roadmap, which is a medium-term plan detailing the actions Finland needs to take to achieve the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the UN in 2015. The roadmap is guided by the six areas of change defined in the work to draw up the 2030 Agenda roadmap. For each area of change, the roadmap includes a vision extending to 2030, a set of objectives that translate the visions into concrete terms, and a description of the key measures that will affect different sectors of society and play a key role in bringing about change. In addition to the six areas of change, the strategy discusses how Finland is supporting the implementation of the 2030 Agenda globally. These six areas are: 1. Economy and work promoting wellbeing and sustainable consumption, 2. Education, competence and sustainable lifestyles, 3. Wellbeing, health and social inclusion, 4. Food system promoting wellbeing, 5. Forest, water and land use promoting biodiversity and carbon neutrality and 6. Sustainable energy system.

The roadmap also includes five cross-cutting principles comply with in its implementation. The principles are the following: ensuring fairness, equity and gender equality; facilitating the inclusion and participation of society at large; paying special attention to the most vulnerable (leaving no one behind); ensuring long-term commitment and policy coherence; and taking global responsibility.

The goal of Finnish development policy and development cooperation is to strengthen developing countries’ own capacity and resilience. The countries’ ownership, needs and national plans play a key role in this. Finland allocates resources to achieving systemic changes that strengthen the partner countries, as well as their societies and communities’ opportunities and abilities to secure the wellbeing and income of people in a better and more sustainable way. Finland’s Taxation for Development Action Programme (2020–2023) supports developing countries’ efforts to strengthen their tax systems and have a say in global tax policy negotiations. Another goal is to ensure that companies supported with development cooperation funding comply with the criteria for tax responsibility and transparency. For more info: https://kestavakehitys.fi/en/frontpage

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LESSONS FROM FINLAND

Finland is one of the most successful countries in the world when it comes to citizens’ wellbeing. This development has been the result of conscious decisions seeking to foster gender equality, education, equity and equal opportunities for participation and to ensure good operating conditions for businesses. Finland’s success is built on competence and innovation. It’s natural resources have also played an integral role in increasing economic wellbeing.
This report analyses the extent to which Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD) informs the development that is taking place in Asia-Pacific, with a particular focus on climate action & climate justice.

The report finds that, overall, development in many Asian-Pacific countries is informed by a very basic level of policy coherence where climate action and SDGs are concerned. It offers recommendations on how this situation across the region could be improved.

The study is based on the premise that a credible approach to PCSD includes both vertical coherence (i.e. between local, national, regional and international levels) and horizontal coherence (i.e. between environmental, economic, and social policy areas and sectors as well as governance mechanisms).

The study notes that SDG target 17.14, and the newly developed SDG global indicator 17.14.1, on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development provide a useful monitoring tool for measuring PCSD.

The study also notes that the multi-part indicator for 17.14.1 makes it clear that the implementation of a PCSD approach requires the emergence of truly democratic participatory processes and “whole-of-society” approaches with a vibrant civic infrastructure across all levels of governance. Examples of participatory governance mechanisms relevant to a PCSD approach include citizens’ assemblies and multi-stakeholder sustainable development councils.

This initial study undertook a rapid assessment of climate action, mainly through commitments in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) in specific countries across the Asia-Pacific region, and policy coherence for sustainable development in the context of SDG implementation.

Primary data was collected through case studies and secondary data through a desk review. The contributors provided data through a mix of tools including policy papers (e.g. India, RoK and Sri Lanka), opinion pieces (Nepal, Mongolia & Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam) and case studies of issues, social groups (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Uzbekistan & Thailand) as well as through PRA (Kiribati).

The study does not claim to be exhaustive: the data, comprised of diverse and inclusive peoples’ perspectives, is not uniform in its approach. Though the report cannot unpack in an in-depth way NDC-SDG interlinkages, it is still a good starting point for future insights into barriers to policy coherence for sustainable development and viable modalities for reforms in the climate and SDG governance architecture.
This report analyzed climate action and progress on PCSD in specific countries in the region from the perspective of four key dimensions of the SDG indicator 17.14.1. (i) political commitment and leadership, (ii) institutional structure, (iii) policy integration and conflict, and (iv) people’s participation. Overall, some policy coherence can be detected at theoretical level in the NDCs. However, this has yet to percolate into policies, programmes or institutions.

KEY FINDINGS

Political Commitment and Leadership

While an increasing number of countries are theoretically in agreement on policy coherence for sustainable development, political commitment and leadership are yet to emerge at a practical level. Political instability can also adversely affect political commitment (e.g. in Nepal). Only a few countries have passed legislation on climate action or sustainable development enhancing the long-term level of accountability of the government around the Paris Agreement, Agenda 2030 and SDGs. There are examples of positive practice, such as The Republic of Korea’s Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth which brings both climate action and sustainable development together, and Sri Lanka’s Sustainable Development Act, 2017. Sri Lanka’s revised NDC, adopted in 2021, also shows deeper analysis and interlinkages with many SDGs including SDG5.

Institutional structures

PCSD relies on the creation of appropriate institutional structures that coordinate actors, promote coherence and evaluate trade-offs and synergies. However, the creation of institutional structures for planning and implementation remains uneven and sporadic across Asia-Pacific. For example, Bangladesh’s NDC does not even mention the SDGs. India has set up a Prime Minister’s Council on climate change under the leadership of the Prime Minister that lacks focus on sustainable development. However, National and State Action Plans which cover various sectors (and the SDGs) can compensate for this, as they prescribe actions across the SDGs and climate action. As indicator 17.14.1 makes clear, budgeting is vital to support action on PCSD. Where budgets attached to SDG actions cannot be tracked, or inadequate budget allocations are made, this shows a lack of seriousness in enacting commitments to address PCSD.
Policy integration and conflicts

Asia-Pacific countries are still struggling to remove barriers in planning, governance and implementation of climate goals that lead to conflict with sectoral policies. This study identifies five key areas of policy incoherence:

- **Mitigation and adaptation**: the NDCs in the region are mitigation-focused and fail to capitalize on the opportunity of availing of the co-benefits of adaptation policies.
- **Renewables and fossil fuels**: While many countries have put forward ambitious renewable energy plans, they are still quite tentative about reducing their fossil fuel dependence evident of the massive subsidies compared to peanuts in renewable sources. Energy transitions are taking place within fossil fuels as most attempt a fuel switch from coal to gas, rather than to renewable energy.
- **Commitments and actions on forestry**: where forests are concerned, policy conflicts are commonplace. While countries talk about increasing forest cover, halting and reversing deforestation, in practice, many countries are taking actions to the contrary. For example, India and Sri Lanka have revised the definition of forests to include plantations, giving an appearance that forest cover is increasing while in fact natural forests—the rarest and most important ecological systems—are being lost, mainly due to increasing demand of animal/livestock agriculture and industrial farming.
- **Economic growth and sustainable development**: Many countries are in the process of aligning their NDC commitments (more ambitious) with their national and sectoral policies which are more traditional and focus largely on “economic growth dominant development”. Sustainable development cannot be sacrificed in this conflict.
- **Integrating “leave no one behind” in PCSD**: The SDGs commit countries to prioritizing marginalized, vulnerable and disadvantaged populations, but this can be forgotten in policies on climate action. For example, in Bangladesh, 8,000 farmers and fisher families are threatened with dislocation due to Rampal Thermal Power Project closing the biggest wetland and Ramsar protected site of Sundarbans. In Indonesia too, despite the promise to return ancestral land to indigenous population, more small farmers and plantation workers are facing dispossession. In Thailand, a large number of women (farmers) are being left behind in social protection benefits including universal health coverage, contesting government claims that all Thais are covered.
People's participation

The Asia Pacific region has a poor record historically of people’s participation in policy making and participation is worsening in the context of climate action and the SDGs. PCSD requires a concerted effort to involve all key stakeholders, ensuring equal participation in the process. But while many countries mention the participation of stakeholders in their NDCs, they fail to provide more explicit information on how their inputs were incorporated into NDC development. Case studies in this report affirm that in a large number of countries there has been no public consultation in the NDC development or climate action and responses (e.g. Kiribati, Mongolia). Similarly, the general public is also unaware of public consultations being held while planning or implementing the SDGs or while preparing the VNRs.

In addition to the many examples of failures to consult with stakeholders across the region, there are other instances of governments actively closing down civic space. India and the Philippines have seen a large number of activists, forest and environmental defenders being terrorized and facing charges of being perceived as “anti-national.” In the Philippines, environmental or forest defenders are hounded by the anti-Terrorism Act while the ancestral land of the indigenous populations is being parcelled away at a concerning rate.
Develop a clear PCSD roadmap: Governments should develop a PCSD roadmap with time-bound targets. Governments implementing the 2030 Agenda should commit to achieving policy coherence for sustainable development by creating functioning PCSD governance mechanisms.

Create Awareness: A positive narrative should be created by governments and other key stakeholders around PCSD by emphasising the great leverage PCSD can have for sustainable development and NDCs by showcasing transferable, up-scalable and promising practices.

Create avenues for CSO and people’s participation: Reflecting a “whole of society” approach to sustainable development and climate justice, effective spaces and mechanisms should be created for civil society organisations and other stakeholders to participate in PCSD discussions, in particular ensuring relevant connections with local communities (and developed countries need to ensure dialogue with local communities in the Global South where their policymaking has clear policy impacts on these communities).
REGIONAL LEVEL

- **Create spaces for learning and discussion**: PCSD is not discussed enough, and not understood well enough. Discussion and peer learning around PCSD between national contexts is vital. Sub-regions and regions provide the best space for peer learning and deep exchange of knowledge, experience, insights, challenges and cutting-edge success factors.
- **Assign a lead role for APFSD**: APFSD can take a lead in initiating such discussions at sub-regional and regional forums, incentivizing smaller countries with capacity building support and developing tools to support progress towards PCSD.
- **Build national capacity**: Identify and respond to the capacity building needs of developing countries. Capacity building is most often cited critical need in the NDCs of the developing countries.

GLOBAL LEVEL

- **Ensure more discussion of governance for PCSD at the HLPF**: At the HLPF a thematic session could be devoted to discussing and highlighting best practices in overcoming barriers and challenges in policy coherence. SDG 16, parallel with SDG 17, should be annually reviewed due to its cross-cutting implications with a decisive bearing on the agenda 2030’s success.
- **Ensure more recognition for regional perspectives**: The outcomes from regional mechanisms that reflect local aspirations (such as the APFSD) need adequate formal recognition across global deliberative processes to ensure policy coherence.
• **Use other UN Forums as springboards**: As the SDGs and the Agenda 2030 form the core of discussion in addition to climate crisis and its manifestations and management at all UN fora, (viz. UNFCCC, UNCBD, UNCCD, UNEA) a PCSD-centered discussion can be a springboard to elevate discussions, understanding and insights on the policy coherence.

• **Take PCSD seriously across the globe**: Policy coherence does not just require horizontal coherence within countries, but between them. Developed countries need to monitor and evaluate the probable impacts of their policies beyond their borders, substantively reduce such impacts, and address the sustainable development deficits that these policies might create. They also need to acknowledge the loss & damage already created as a consequence of their policies, and support climate action (mitigation, adaptation, as well as loss and damages) and growth towards a sustainable and just future.

• **Establish a global PCSD institution**: A global steering body/committee should develop a standard and recommended process/structures for PCSD, which should be flexible and adaptable to different government models of the countries, and monitor progress over time towards that standard.
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CLIMATE JUSTICE & POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: AGENDA 2030 & PCSD.
CLIMATE JUSTICE

The Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda represent two complimentary global frameworks for eradicating poverty and hunger and achieving environmental sustainability. For the first time, these frameworks reflect a bottom-up approach in international policymaking. While countries have laid down “nationally determined commitments” (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement; 2030 Agenda gives flexibility to the countries to chart their own sustainable development pathways and programmes within the rubric of sustainable development goals. One cannot be achieved if the other derails. Climate policies or NDCs go much beyond climate action and intersect with several SDG goals. NDCs also have strong connections with some of the SDGs (which they support and reinforce); while also very weak connection and interlinkages with many SDGs.

An SEI study\(^1\) which examined connections between the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda (Sept, 2019) reviewed 164 NDCs found that the strongest connections existed between the NDCs and Affordable and clean energy (SDG 7), Life on land (SDG15), No Hunger (SDG2) and Sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11). It is interesting to note that climate action (SDG13) itself did not have very strong linkage with the NDC possibly due to the limited nature of the SDG13. There were weak connections between NDCs and No Poverty (SDG1), Gender Equality (SDG5), reducing inequality (SDG10). NDCs showed the weakest connection with peace, justice and transparent institutions (SDG16).

Therefore, a policy coherence for sustainable development approach provides a helpful tool for better understanding how climate policies and SDG policies support each other, and to identify and plug gaps. In a national policy framework, the policy coherence analysis becomes critical both on the horizontal level (sectoral policies vis-à-vis sustainability policies, generally looked at add ons) and at vertical level (on short term and long term as well as between national and sub national policies). It is essential that countries establish coherence between the policies on climate change (and NDCs) and sustainable development programmes. However, due to the weak relationship between the climate and the sustainable development agendas at the global and national levels, the prospects of achieving either of them is threatened.

This study aims to examine the extent to which policy coherence exists in countries across the Asia Pacific region between national policies linked to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda on sustainable development and climate policies which are linked to the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement.
Since its adoption in 2015, the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has become a key framework for international cooperation, a global social contract between governments and people of the world, influencing how UN member states collectively and individually approach sustainable development. Thanks to the 2030 Agenda, the world now has this global framework as a roadmap for achieving sustainable development and equality for all. The principles enshrined in the overall 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) themselves are universal, meaning that all 193 countries who signed the UN Agenda 2030, are expected to achieve them, but not at the expense of other countries or future generations’ ability to do so.

On the basis of current progress with the implementation of the Agenda 2030 however, no country is in a position to achieve all SDGs by 2030. Even before the Covid 19 pandemic, no country was in a position to achieve all the SDGs, including the climate related goals (SDG12, SDG 13, SDG 14 & SDG15). Behind the rhetoric of making development sustainable and inclusive for all and leaving no one behind, very few countries have assumed a meaningful emissions reduction burden, according to their fair share. Other challenges such as the high unsustainable debt burdens of many developing countries, illicit financial flows, reduction in ODA and the shrinking of fiscal and policy space for other critical priorities all impacted negatively on the ability of countries, and particularly developing countries, to achieve the goals and targets of the SDGs.

The pandemic also dealt a severe blow to progress with implementing the 2030 Agenda. The most important learning from the pandemic should have been the need to restrain humans from altering nature and protecting planetary boundaries and natural habitats. Yet globally the majority of the responses from different governments neglected this in the race to regain economic strength. Environmental standards were relaxed, monitoring reduced, and penalties for environmental violations waive. Fossil fuel and other companies which are responsible for profoundly adverse impacts on the environment and the climate were rescued with huge amounts of bailouts. Reuters News Agency reported2 in November 2020 that G20 countries which together account for more than 80% of global emissions had committed more than $230 billion in dirty energy in their Covid-19 recovery funds.
In contrast, the support for clean energy amounted to only $150 billion. Between 2017 to 2019, G20 countries provided a subsidy of close to $584 billion per year to dirty energy, only 9% less than the subsidies they provided in 2014-2016. Seven countries including Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Russia and South Africa increased their support to fossil fuel companies during these years. (Reuters, 2020).

Business as usual continued, with International Financing Institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), pushing for further belt-tightening measures across 76 of its 90 negotiated loans in 2020/21 despite the global need for strengthening healthcare and social protection sectors, posing a serious question about the leadership provided by multilateral organisations. The inability of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Ministerial Conference to waive the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) stipulations, severely affected the ability of developing countries to recover from Covid-19 recovery in the absence of technology transfer for vaccines and other medical technologies.

THE PARIS CLIMATE AGREEMENT

Climate change is a global challenge which, according to the widely ratified Paris Climate Agreement, requires all countries to tackle it both domestically and internationally. Under this agreement, all countries have committed to prevent the rise in global temperatures to well below 2C and to make further efforts to keep it below 1.5C by the end of the century. In Glasgow, the COP26 reaffirmed the overarching aim of achieving the 1.5C goal. The big flaw in the Paris Agreement, which also represents a policy coherence conflict from a justice perspective, is that all countries are required to make efforts irrespective of their historical role – in other words regardless of how much carbon they have issued into the atmosphere from the start of the industrial revolution and of how much of the mitigation burden they should assume in accordance with their historical emissions. The seven historical polluters - the UK, USA, Australia, Canada, Russia, Japan and the EU - will still occupy 26% of total carbon space in 2030. The poorer and developing countries are denied legitimate development space in return for a low ambition among the developed and industrialized countries in significantly reduce their own emissions, and to share finance, technology and capacity.
Another policy conflict related to this is that while it is essential that countries engage in steep short-term emission reductions to the tune of 7-8% every year until 2030 to remain within the possibility of preventing the rise in temperature below 1.5°C, they continue to target the extremely ambitious target of net zero in 2050. As a result, global emissions have been rising and will have increased by 13.7% in 2030, as compared to in 2010. Investment in energy returned to be leveraged for fossil fuel in the wake of the pandemic. Several studies show that only a small fraction of the financial stimulus (USD 18 billion approx.) can be called green investment. In addition, industrialized countries have continued with their generous support to the fossil fuel industries in the form of subsidies and bail outs. It is clear therefore that a policy coherence for development approach where climate policy is concerned will be critically important if the ambitious aims and objectives of the Paris Climate Agreement are to be achieved.

The majority of developing countries which are most impacted by the climate crisis, have already a huge adaptation burdens are also compelled to further reduce their emissions denying them the essential carbon space to meet their developmental challenges. They are likely to falter in achieving their NDC and also the SDGs without genuine efforts to ensure policy coherence at a global level.

**POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (PCSD)**

The 2030 Agenda specifies a highly integrated policy approach to achieving sustainable development, involving coherence between policies at different levels and across different policy areas and sectors. Such policy coherence for sustainable development includes both vertical coherence (i.e. between local, national, regional and international and local levels) and horizontal coherence (i.e. between environmental, economic, and social policy areas and sectors as well as governance mechanisms). SDG17 of the 2030 Agenda includes a target on promoting policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) ((Target 17.14: “Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development”) and this target is accompanied by Indicator 17.14.1: (“mechanisms in place to enhance policy coherence for sustainable development”).

PCSD is thus a very wide ranging and multi-directional principle. The entire conceptual frame of the 2030 Agenda is thus to achieve well integrated and coherent policymaking which recognizes the wider impact of all policies beyond the immediate effect that they are individually intended to achieve. The adoption of a PCSD approach helps to reduce in-coherences across policies in different sectors, improve policy synergies, configure complementarity effects and resolve trade-offs between different interests. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), PCSD is “an approach and policy tool to integrate the economic, social, environmental, and governance dimensions of sustainable development at all stages of domestic and international policy making.” The relevance of a PCSD approach to ensuring the effective implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement is also very difficult to deny.
THE ROLE THAT PCSD CAN PLAY IN AVOIDING A FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO THE PURSUIT OF DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

The ambition of achieving contemporary development priorities while ensuring the conservation of the natural resource base for the future requires holistic programming involving multifaceted actors and expertise. This study sets out to demonstrate that it is high time for the international community to attempt to consolidate hard-fought gains linked to the implementation of key normative frameworks such as the Agenda 2030 and the Paris Climate Agreement, and to better align their future implementation through the pursuit of well-planned, policy coherence for sustainable development strategies. Such an approach would support a more holistic conceptualization of development centering on the primacy of human rights as well as on the integrity of the natural environment and its ecosystems. A major advantage of promoting a PCSD approach in how these two major international policy frameworks are implemented is that, along with an important emphasis on cross-cutting, multisectoral, holistic tracking and reporting, PCSD requires avoiding the duplication of effort resulting in a fragmented analysis of development priorities.

Finally, achieving a sufficient level of political will to mobilize international cooperation on policy coherence for sustainable development will depend on the continued existence of the well-functioning multilateral system that has already produced the 2030 Agenda and other important international policy frameworks.
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT.
MEASURING INTERNATIONAL PROGRESS ON POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The difficulties involved in identifying indicators for measuring progress on policy coherence for sustainable development have attracted considerable academic attention. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was given the responsibility within the UN system to propose a way forward for measuring progress on Target 14 (PCSD) of SDG17 (partnerships and means of implementation) in the context of monitoring the 2030 Agenda. The indicator proposed by UNEP is extremely comprehensive and is part of the official set of indicators for the 2030 Agenda. This indicator focuses on eight mechanisms that are key to ensuring policy coherence and which provide long-term leverage for PCSD. A government would be expected to put in place the following mechanisms if it intended to achieve policy coherence for sustainable development: (1.) Institutionalised political commitment1 (2) . Long-term considerations in decision-making (3). Inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral coordination (4). Participatory processes (5). Policy linkages (6). Alignment across government levels (7). Monitoring and reporting for policy coherence 8. Financing for policy coherence.

THE OECD RECOMMENDATION ON PCSD

The OECD has been an important platform for promoting PCSD and developing conceptual thinking on policy coherence and its implementation. This is reflected in its recently revised Council Recommendation on PCSD (OECD 2019) which concisely summarises the main measures that governments can take to promote PCSD. PCSD is defined by the OECD as “an approach and policy tool to integrate the economic, social, environmental, and governance dimensions of sustainable development at all stages of domestic and international policy making”5 while “its objectives are to advance the integrated implementation of the 2030 Agenda.”6 It is a framework for analysing the synergies and trade-offs between and across sustainable development policy throughout all stages of the policy making process and ensuring inclusive, participatory and transparent decision-making.
The OECD Recommendation on Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development (PCSD), provides a comprehensive standard to help countries equip policy-makers and key stakeholders with the necessary institutional mechanisms and policy tools to enhance PCSD and accelerate progress on SDGs. To translate policy coherence principles into concrete action at different levels, the OECD-UNDP Global Hub on the Governance for the SDGs aims to help countries build governance capabilities and leadership in support of SDGs. PCSD is now recognised in global governance as a key ‘Means of Implementation’ of the 2030 Agenda and a key element for delivering the SDGs at the global level and to be pursued by all governments.

**CORE ELEMENTS FOR TRACKING PCSD**

Tracking progress on PCSD, both at national and other levels is an important step toward ensuring implementation and monitoring effectiveness. PCSD indicators are crucial for understanding the relationship between the various actors, processes and drivers of a system. Different sets of indicators can be used to track progress on PCSD, depending on the elements of policy coherence to be monitored. However, the OECD has outlined what it sees as the core elements for tracking PCSD at the national level.

These include the assumption of high-level responsibility and central leadership for PCSD, the appointment of dedicated coordinators and points of contact, vertical coordination and the coordination of the PCSD response with sub-national governments, adapting existing finance and governance structures to tackle challenges, ensuring trust through evidence-based decision-making and heightened reliance on science and technical expertise, effective and coherent public communication and finally ‘scenario-based’ planning and the integration of strategic foresight to inform debate and decision-making about PCSD in the longer term. This requires a strong emphasis on enhancing the strategic capacity of national statistical commissions to track transformation by complementing it through indicative data produced by academia, citizen-led initiatives and civil society organizations. It also requires a comprehensive alignment of several reporting processes at the national and global level to synthesize the analysis vis a vis use to better conceptualize PCSD mechanisms.
GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF PCSD

As PCSD covers all government portfolios, overall responsibility should lie with the head of the government and his/her cabinet. This will ensure that PCSD will be promoted and emerging inevitable trade-offs will be resolved. Various countries have recognised this necessity and have shifted responsibility for policy coherence for sustainable development out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where it was, to the Office of the Head of State. The OECD itself has also recognised that in practical terms the final responsibility for PCSD should move to a centre-of-government level (OECD 2019) and cannot just be kept in a single line ministry. For example, the government of Finland moved responsibility for PCSD to the Prime Minister’s office where it is managed by the National Commission on Sustainable Development (van Seters et al 2020). Similarly, France has a General Commissariat for Sustainable Development under the Prime Minister’s office (van Seters et al 2020).

Governments implementing the 2030 Agenda should commit to achieving policy coherence for sustainable development by creating functioning PCSD governance mechanisms. This will require maintaining PCSD and the SDGs among the top government priorities, beyond partisan mandates or electoral cycles as state level priorities. This should strengthen the mobilization of a collective political will fostering competitive yet complementary party manifestos as well as restricting regressive trends. It will call for robust data as well as strong institutions, coordination mechanisms and tools, such as impact assessments, budget systems, and reporting systems to parliaments enabling efficient policy oversight for comprehensive planning, implementation and review mechanisms. A dedicated PCSD rapporteur should be appointed to promote PCSD between government departments, across the entire government and internationally. Also, inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and a dedicated unit within the Prime Minister’s office to promote PCSD will foster horizontal and vertical coordination.

Finally, according to the most recent CONCORD PCSD report 20227 PCSD is an underestimated, even ignored, but very crucial element in achieving the 2030 Agenda worldwide. The CONCORD report argues that when implementing the 2030 Agenda it is vital to respect the interlinkages between different sectors, and between the domestic and external dimensions of policymaking. The report also mentions that to look at policymaking through the lens of sustainable development requires a new form of governance: one that addresses the root causes of today’s challenges and that focuses on a long-term vision and overall system change. It proposes that the aims of a PCSD approach should be to“foster synergies across policy areas and between sectors, ensure that today’s policies do not undermine the well-being or sustainable development of future generations, identify and address trade-offs, or negative spill overs, both between different domestic policies, and where domestic policies affect other countries. It points out that policy coherence for sustainable development can support countries to achieve sustainable development, whereas policy incoherence can seriously undermine it. For example, European Union (EU) trade policy might create economic gains for the EU but might have devastating impacts on partner countries’ economy, their environment and their poorest communities.
PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS & PCSD

Many PCSD studies point to the importance of including a sound political economy analysis when implementing policy coherence for sustainable development, understanding the stakeholders’ interests in the decisions being made. Promoting PCSD is inevitably political, so it is important to have a good grasp of the different stakeholder interests before policy decisions are made. To date, the experience of many countries that have implemented a genuine PCSD approach to policymaking is that the introduction of multi-stakeholder and participatory governance mechanisms is important to address current complex issues and challenges (reference CONCORD report8). The implementation of a PCSD approach therefore, requires the emergence of truly democratic participatory processes and “whole-of-society” approaches constituting a vibrant civic infrastructure across all levels of governance. Examples of participatory governance mechanisms relevant to a PCSD approach include citizen assemblies and multi-stakeholder sustainable development councils.

EXAMPLES OF POLICY INCOHERENCE

One prominent example of policy incoherence was in the area of Food Security where the EU reformed its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2013 because its agricultural policies were not consistent with its policies on international development. The reform of the EU’s CAP resulted in a significant reduction in EU export subsidies which had historically resulted in price-distorting effects on the markets of developing countries, negatively impacting agricultural producers and communities in the global south.

Another example is that of developed countries which in an effort to “go green” and become more sustainable, opt for sources of energy that make them dependent on minerals from unsustainable mining sites in developing countries (e.g. lithium to make batteries for electric cars). This causes the ecological or material “footprint” of developed countries to be far higher than their global “fair share” and would indicate that they were taking too many natural resources from elsewhere while posing serious environmental and social costs to the developing countries.
Developed countries also often pay too low a price for commodities produced in the developing world or for the labour involved in producing these commodities. This can affect exporting countries in their efforts to implement their SDG agenda, because it results in the exploitation of cheap labour, inadequate working conditions, inequality, increased food insecurity, degradation of soils and groundwater, deforestation and biodiversity loss etc., among others.

This requires a conscious reconfiguration of global economic governance in particular paralleled by equitable redistribution of wealth, power and resources through a political will that prioritizes people and the planet over profits. PCSD could serve as a roadmap towards that ambition provided it is prioritized as a critical consideration ahead of consensus at the very heart of our multilateralism.

**A PROMISING PCSD-RELATED PRACTICE**

Eurostat, the European level statistical office, has developed an indicator for spill over effects on consumption patterns in the EU, which it presented in its 2021 Report. This is very promising. For several years now, Eurostat has invested heavily in tracking transboundary environmental impacts by modelling footprint indicators based on official statistics. It now calculates three types of environmental spill overs: the material footprint, the carbon and CO2 emissions footprint and the air pollution footprint. It also measures a social spill over (employment) and an economic spill over (income). It has become clear that the EU’s material footprint is far too high in relation to its ‘fair share’. This could serve as a model for configuring similar analytical mechanisms at global, regional, national as well as the local level to better understand intersectional ties as well as negotiate trade-offs across policy pursuits. In parallel, it is imperative to utilize the evidence base to inform the policy processes for holistic counter measures. Such an evidence base could also unlock several policy advocacy instruments and avenues for robust follow up and accountability mechanisms for sustainable development.
PCSD & POLITICAL CHALLENGES FACED

Since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda countries have started to integrate the SDGs into national plans and strategies, and many have set up dedicated institutional structures and governance mechanisms for coordinating implementation. However, addressing synergies and trade-offs between economic, social and environmental policy objectives, while avoiding the negative effects of policies still is a major challenge for most countries worldwide. Eight years now and, the aftermath of COVID-19 has pushed back several gains on sustainable development urges the need for expeditious, elaborate and efficient policy action. Policymakers are struggling to manage and leverage linkages among goals and to operationalize an integrated and coherent implementation of the SDGs with the involvement of all key stakeholders. Governments and policymakers need to consider several key issues where PCSD is concerned - what governance mechanisms can be used to balance competing sectoral priorities, minimize trade-offs and facilitate synergies? How to ensure that the needs of future generations are considered systematically in policymaking? How to maintain political commitment beyond electoral cycles? How can countries in the pursuit of the well-being of their citizens avoid negative effects on other countries and future generations? These are some of the difficult questions that policymakers are facing.

The promotion of PCSD is highly political in nature. Each policy in each sector has its backers and interest groups pushing for a particular course of action and arguing that their view should be dominant. A commitment to policy coherence for sustainable development with other policies in other sectors puts limits on how far each policy can go and each interest can be satisfied. Finding win-win solutions that will please all stakeholders in each policy sector is frequently difficult and it is often the case that there will be losers as well as winners. Technical tools and administrative mechanisms to find coherent policy solutions can go so far as to build a consensus, but in the end some level of arbitration is likely to be needed. This is compounded by the absence of data on almost half the indicators on SDGs with a variance of degree across countries and regions. UNESCAP’s 2022 report indicated that the current rate of progress would mean that the Asian Pacific region could only achieve the SDGs by 2065. The situation across other regions may not be different with variant sets of issues and bottlenecks across tiers of governance. Policy coherence for sustainable development mechanisms can help make the process to reach the decision point more transparent and democratic, but ultimately established political decision-making institutions will need to take over for the final step.
ASSESSING PROGRESS ON CLIMATE JUSTICE.

REFLECTING ON THE OUTCOMES OF THE COP 27 IN EGYPT, NOVEMBER 2022.
INTRODUCTION

In the final days of COP 27, the collective power of vulnerable and marginalized communities, social movements, and civil society breathed into life a historic agreement among governments present to set up a Loss and Damage Fund. This is a positive step in inching towards justice for those most affected by the climate crisis, and in holding to account historically polluting nations.

But such gains on the loss and damage conversation is undermined by a COP that ultimately fails to signal the phaseout of all fossil fuels. It will be no different to prescribing medicine to relieve pain for a sick person without addressing the root cause of his sickness.

The cover decision of this year’s COP barely builds on the outcomes of the Glasgow pact, which calls for only the phase down of unabated coal and restricts subsidies for fossil fuels. The presidency and global leaders touted COP 27 as the ’implementation COP’ - in the end it seems that what it sought to implement is the abandonment of the 1.5C ambition due to more coal, gas, and oil. It need not be said that going beyond 1.5C means even more unspeakable loss and damage for vulnerable people.

But the final text does not speak for the multitudes of voices calling for a phaseout of fossil fuels. Civic movements and climate science have long called out coal, gas, and oil as the culprit to the catastrophic changes in our global climate. At COP 27, dozens of governments joined in to say that fossil fuels must be phased out - yet a handful of nations including China, Philippines and Saudi Arabia, blocked a key proposal to phase out all fossil fuels, not just coal. It is more than frustrating to see overdue steps on mitigation and the phase-out of fossil energies being stonewalled by a number of large emitters and oil producers.

It cannot be denied that the urgent need for an equitable phaseout of all fossil fuels has made its mark in today’s global consciousness. This is a reality that we would be bringing back to the fight for a just energy transition in our own home countries, a much more spirited fight that the fossil fuel industry and its backers would find themselves confronting and losing even beyond COP.
LOSS AND DAMAGE FUNDS

Some of the countries that had pushed hardest for the new fund for loss and damage simultaneously tried to weaken language around phasing down fossil fuels. The COP27 agreements are in line with what came out of the Glasgow meeting last year, to accelerate “efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies”, rather than being strengthened to phasing down fossil fuels as some countries had pushed for. In a historic decision, after 30 years of delay and inaction, Parties at COP 27 established a Loss and Damage fund, a first step towards redress and accountability for the human rights harm caused to millions confronting climate impacts on the frontlines.

It also included a new reference to “low emission and renewable energy”. The Egyptian presidency said the language reflected part of the “just transition” adopted by all parties, which includes the use of hydrogen and nuclear energy to reduce emissions.

For some, the Egyptian presidency had delivered a satisfactory deal by forging the agreement to set up a loss and damage fund. The idea had been resisted for years by some of the largest emitters, such as the United States and Europe, who were worried about the extent of liabilities.

Loss and damage was “the one thing the climate activists wanted for ages, which was finally made at a COP being hosted by a developing country, that in itself is a great win because it shows their diplomatic strength.”

However, many climate activists and some delegates believe little progress had been made on most other issues, contending that the tone had been set by fossil fuel producers who played a more public and prominent role in Sharm el-Sheikh than at previous summits.
As per the relevant decision text:

The Conference of the Parties …

Acknowledge the urgent and immediate need for new, additional, predictable and adequate financial resources to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in responding to economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, especially in the context of ongoing and ex post (including rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction) action;

Decide to establish new funding arrangements for assisting developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in responding to loss and damage, including with a focus on addressing loss and damage by providing and assisting in mobilizing new and additional resources, and these new arrangements complement and include sources, funds, processes and initiatives under and outside the Convention and the Paris Agreement;

Also decide, in the context of establishing the new funding arrangements referred to…above, to establish a fund for responding to loss and damage whose mandate includes a focus on addressing loss and damage."

The fact that we have a fund at all is a testament to the immense collective power of the unity of social movement and Indigenous leaders, civil society campaigners, and the G77 plus China, building on tireless efforts over decades, staring down relentless initiatives to block the fund from the outset from countries like the USA and some EU nations.

Much work remains to be done in terms of operationalizing the loss and damage fund and implementation thereof to ensure that the fund is not just an empty shell but fit-for-purpose, sufficiently resourced, and in line with human rights, climate justice, and the needs of communities and Indigenous Peoples. Moreover, while we welcome the much needed establishment of a finance facility, we recognize that no amount of money can recompense communities who have suffered the irreparable losses of their territories, cultures and traditions.

At COP 27, also witnessed the operationalization of the implementation arm of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), namely the Santiago Network, an important element to ensure the WIM delivers on its third function: enhancing action and support through catalyzing technical assistance.

A text was adopted affirming that technical assistance provided by the Santiago Network for Loss should be in line with the Paris Agreement’s preambular text on human rights, including also other human rights-aligned language and considerations, such as ensuring representation from the women and gender constituency, indigenous peoples organizations, and children and youth non-governmental organizations on the Advisory Board of the Santiago Network, and gender reporting including through the use of gender-disaggregated data. The text is far from perfect but creates a foundation for human rights-based approaches. We know human rights-based climate action leads to more effective outcomes - what will be important now is to monitor how this all plays out in practice, reinforcing the existing human rights obligations of States[1].
FINAL NEGOTIATIONS

In the final 24 hours, the COP presidency held a meeting where calls from negotiators from countries and groups including Switzerland, the United States, Latin America and small island states, for Egypt to include language initially proposed by India to phase down all fossil fuels were unheeded, where at least 80 countries supported such language. Egypt will hold the COP presidency until it hands over to the United Arab Emirates, an ally and a major hydrocarbons producer, in just under a year.

"Holding COPs in petro-states may seem counterproductive but actually we can’t ignore these countries. They need to be engaged in the process and putting pressure on them as a COP host may provide bigger gains.

KEY OUTCOMES

In terms of key outcomes, COP 27 was the first environmental negotiation process to include an explicit reference to the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. This was made possible due to sustained civil society advocacy and their continued efforts to strengthen environmental governance across the board recognizing that the real fight lies ahead in translating initial steps into strong outcomes meaningful for those most affected by climate impacts. The civil society called out the abysmal failure of Parties to make any significant collective progress on the phase out of all fossil fuels. Loss and damage cannot be adequately addressed without tackling the root causes of the climate crisis. Continued addiction to fossil fuels will only see impacts worsening, leading to continued and devastating human rights harm.
Cop 27 ended on early 20th November in the tourist town of Sharm El Sheikh. The city amply reflected the COP process. Glitzy and sprawling but lifeless town, the silence punctuated by the humming of big cars and common people, workers, women hard to find by as if they were tucked away somewhere out of sight!

The second most attended COP and probably the longest one, the “green wash festival of the North” ended refusing to move even an inch beyond Glasgow outcomes. Many were ready to retreat, but pulled along to wait for a more opportune moment. The 27th series of COP was organized in the backdrop of huge climate disasters all over the world, especially in Africa and Asia. While in Africa, 8 million were affected and displaced in Ethiopia due to drought and famine and 2500 perishing due to the same in Uganda and Nigeria and South Africa witnessing worst floods of the century. Pakistan became of poster boy of disaster and destruction in Asia with around 2000 dead, tens of millions affected, one third of the country inundated and with $40 million estimates of losses. People had hoped that COP will come with determined efforts to further reduce the emissions fast, scale up climate finance and adaptation finance and the rich countries will acknowledge their historical responsibility and put up a fund for loss and damage for the worst affected and the most vulnerable. However, against this huge surge of sea of expectations; the outcomes clearly manifested the mentality that the poor of the world must fend for themselves. Notwithstanding the fact that they have no contribution in the crisis, notwithstanding the fact they are the ones on the frontlines of the everyday battle against the nature’s wrath, even notwithstanding the fact that their own governments have very little to support and protect them as most of them remain saddled with debts paid many times over!

The most celebrated outcome and historic outcome of the COP 27 was setting up of a fund for addressing loss and damage. Developed countries only agreed to it as determination of the G77 and other similar countries made it impossible to go negotiations further without settling Loss and damage finance facility issue. The history of this demand is as old as the UNFCCC itself and therefore, it is historic. Now Loss and damage has at least a home within labyrinths of the COP negotiations. However, except for crumbs from few rich countries, the money looks hard to come by.
Though it might still take several years for this fund to be put up, operationalized and money actually flowing from this fund. On the margins of it, most vulnerable countries might get capacity in developing early warning systems, and some insurance schemes might also head towards them. However, it leaves us to wonder, which kind of insurance will find it lucrative to work in countries where disasters and destruction are bigger realities than life? But as the real outcomes from the climate negotiations have been so modest that even this “nondescript” fund became joy d vivre for many who thronged the COP to bring accountability on the big polluters past as well as current, public as well as private, hidden as well as ones with the names and addresses!

All other elements of the discussion viz. mitigation, climate finance and adaptation finance as well as global stock take faced usual north south divides. The hosts avoided major confrontations by pushing it for years ahead. Mitigation and finance related issues witnessed almost no progress, so that many commentators (including me attending all COPs after Copenhagen) missed their deadlines on first week outcomes as they did not have anything to report except for bickerings. UNEP’s Emission Gap Report showed that we are still at the danger of 2.4 degree rise even if all promises are kept, far from the Paris Agreement targets. Finance Gap reports showed almost unbridgeable gaps. Ones who have to provide finances, showed incapacity, repeated old promises (and old lies) and wanted to draw in countries who have a per capita GDP of less than their tenth and far more smaller emissions. Land GAP report told us that countries are putting huge faith in magic bullet of the nature Based Solutions (NbS) which will require 1.2 billion hectares of land, which is equal to all crop lands of the world and the area of the United States of America. This can be possible only when we probably remove all human beings from that area!

The long and the short of it that 1.5 degrees target and expectations of poor people in the world still remain on the life support. And everyone knows longer the life support smaller the chances of survival!
LOSS AND DAMAGE (L&D)

- Decision to establish a fund to respond to loss and damage, among other funding arrangements; a transitional committee (with a majority of developing country representatives) to be nominated by Dec. 15th will make recommendations for its operationalisation by COP28.
- United Nations agencies, bilateral, multilateral and international financial institutions called on to submit views on how they might enhance finance for loss and damage [para 7d], and UN Secretary General to convene a summit with international financial institutions’ principals [para 11]
- Operationalisation of the Santiago network aimed at catalysing technical assistance on L&D
- Launch of the Global Shield against climate risks by German-led G7 and V20 helping to secure pre-arranged finance to vulnerable countries, including through insurance.

FINANCE

- Canada-Germany Climate Finance Delivery Plan reviewed progress towards the $100bn and the doubling of adaptation finance on the eve of COP27.
- Just Energy Transition Partnership (JET-P) of $20bn (including $10bn from private sources) between Indonesia and the United States, Japan, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Norway.
- South Africa launched its five-year Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP) for the $8.5bn JET-P announced at COP26.
- Cover decision calls on the shareholders of multilateral development banks and international financial institutions to reform multilateral development bank practices and priorities [para 61].
- France, in partnership with Barbados, looking to establish a high-level panel of experts to suggest innovative ways to unlock climate finance by next IMF/World Bank Spring Meetings (April 2023).
MITIGATION

- Similar language on 1.5C and phasing down coal from last year’s Glasgow Climate Pact; text on fossil-fuel phase-down/out supported by over 80 countries but not included in the final text.
- Adoption of a mitigation work programme convening two dialogues per year until at least 2026, which “will not impose new targets or goals”.
- A few countries updated or fleshed out their commitments: e.g. India submitted its long-term low-carbon development strategy, EU to update its NDC to 57% reduction by 2030 on 1990 levels due to the adoption of a regulation on land use, land-use change and forestry.

ADAPTATION

- Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh work programme initiated the development of a thematic and policy-related framework for the global goal on adaptation.

ACCOUNTABILITY

- The report of the High-Level Panel on net-zero commitments by businesses, financial institutions, cities and regions convened by the UN Secretary General makes 10 recommendations to draw a red line on greenwashing, including that carbon credits in voluntary markets should be used for beyond value chain mitigation only.
- The Carbon Neutrality Coalition released a voluntary framework for net-zero climate action in countries.
- Africa Carbon Markets Initiative led by the UN Champions, and the Energy Transition Accelerator led by the US were launched to develop voluntary carbon markets.
POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION: AN OVERVIEW.
INTRODUCTION

The current initial study looks at a rapid assessment of climate action (mainly through commitments in the NDC), and policy coherence with the SDGs. The primary objective is to look at Institutional, policy and procedural challenges and conflicts in order to suggest how they can be ironed out.

Primary data was collected through case studies and secondary data through a desk review. Countries that were part of this study included India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Thailand, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and Kiribati. The contributors provided data through a mix of tools including policy papers (India, RoK and Sri Lanka), opinion pieces (Nepal, Mongolia & Taiwan) and case studies of issues, social groups (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Uzbekistan & Thailand) as well as through PRA (Kiribati). Due to data received through variety of methods, mainly to include peoples’ perspectives, the study does not claim to be an exhaustive one, and lacks uniformity and universality in data and NDC-SDG interlinkages.

Our analysis shows that Asian countries are at a rudimentary level of policy coherence as far as climate action and SDGs are concerned. Some coherence can be seen at the theoretical level in the NDC, however, it is yet to largely percolate in policies, programmes or institutions. However, based on the data received we tried to analyze it on 4 parameters of (i) political commitment and leadership, (ii) institutional structure, (iii) policy integration and conflict, and (iv) people participation.
POLITICAL COMMITMENT AND LEADERSHIP

Political commitment and leadership provide a strong foundation and vision by translating ambition into legislations or clear policies and action plans. Our analysis shows that while an increasing number of countries theoretically are in agreement on policy coherence for sustainable development, political commitment and leadership is yet to emerge at a realistic level. At best, it remains uneven and sporadic.

Only a few countries have passed legislations on climate action or sustainable development enhancing the status and level of accountability of the government to the Paris Agreement, Agenda 2030 and SDGs. The Republic of Korea has legislated Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth bringing both climate action and sustainable development together. Sri Lanka legislated Sustainable Development Act, 2017 and set up the Ministry of Sustainable development to coordinate the work on the SDGs. Sustainable Development Council has been tasked with the planning and implementation of the SDGs. The revised NDC adopted in 2021 also shows deeper analysis and interlinkages with many SDGs including SDG5.

Political instability in Nepal adversely affects political commitment. Bangladesh NDC has not even mentioned SDGs even once. India has set up a Prime Minister’s Council on climate change under the leadership of the Prime Minister. However, the lack of focus on sustainable development is compensated by linking the National and State Action Plan which covers various sectors (and the SDGs) as they prescribe actions on energy, renewable energy, water, health, food and agriculture, industry, infrastructure, disaster management, etc.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND STRUCTURES

Institutional structures provide a vehicle for the efficient implementation for policy coherence. They manifest whether the impact of the commitment is going deep (down to sub national and local levels) and wide (across sectors and time horizons). They also set up appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and mechanisms for feedback and reporting. At the same time, they also indicate whether these mechanisms are dynamic and have the capacity to improve over time incorporating the feedback loops.

The institutional mechanisms and arrangements seem to be wilting in Asia and the Pacific where climate action and SDGs are still captive in separate siloes. While the ministry of environment is mainly responsible for climate action, SDGs are taken care of by host of agencies including the ministry of development, planning, or national development council. These “agencies” have wider membership. However, the whole of the government approach is still lacking. Especially lacking is horizontal coherence, as there might be institutions at the capital, however, they don’t generally run down to subnational or seldom to local levels. Similarly, in the vertical coherence also, many sectors are still at crossroads (conflict) with climate action or SDGs action plan in general. Even the countries which show high political commitment and deeper interlinkages between climate justice and the SDGs get weak on the institutional arrangement. They often lack details on how coherence will be achieved.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Republic of Korea provides a good case study in the context. In Korea, every municipal and local area government is obliged to follow the National Adaptation Plan (2021-25). The Plan has a linkage with many SDGs and proper implementation will have co-benefits for expediting achievement of many SDGs, but lacks detailed roadmap for implementation. This is also true for the Carbon neutrality and Green Growth Act, which also suffers from poor implementation and monitoring mechanisms.
SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka, where Climate Change Secretariat looks into the implementation of the NDC and the sustainable development council is charged with the administration of the SDGs have both failed to provide much momentum either on the SDGs or policy coherence. The climate change secretariat fails to provide updated information on climate finance.

MONGOLIA

In Mongolia, the SDGs is administered by the National Committee on Sustainable Development under the Prime Minister and are composed of a wide variety of stakeholders including the CSOs, trade unions, consumers and academia. The Committee meets irregularly. Mongolia has failed to adopt national targets and indicators till now. No meeting of the Committee has been held since Mongolia presented its Voluntary National Review (VNR) in 2019. The revised NDC (2021) does not refer to the governance or institutional structure; neither has it laid down any mechanism for the disclosure of information and reporting.

INDIA

In India, no review of the National Action Plan on Climate Change has been conducted in the last 15 years. The States largely lack the capacity, institutional structure, and finance for planning and implementation and are still revising their Action Plan on climate change to align it with the SDGs. The Niti Aayog, which is the nodal agency for the SDGs implementation is only concerned with developing annual SDGs report and Index and the state do not have any guidance on how to better align SDGs with their development programmes.

KIRIBATI

In Kiribati, people on the frontlines of climate change hardly know about governments’ plan and policies with regard to climate change and have differential threat perceptions of impacts due to a lack of appropriate information and communication.
POLICY INTEGRATION, COHERENCE AND CONFLICT

Poor political commitment and gaps in institutional structure are bound to lead to inappropriate policy integration, lack of coherence and lots of policy conflict, which is clearly reflected in the countries reviewed. From the data available, there are two very clear trends. One, the NDCs in the region are mitigation focused and fail to capitalize on the opportunity of availing co-benefits that policy coherence provides, second energy transition is taking place within fossil fuel as most of them attempt a fuel switch (from coal to gas) rather than go for energy transition. While many countries have put forward ambitious renewable energy plans, they are still quite tentative about reducing their fossil fuel dependence. These trends are indicative of continued and or (even increased) policy conflicts than policy coherence for sustainable development.

India has made impressive gains in renewable energy, yet it has allocated new coal blocks for mining, intends to increase its coal production and is increasing its pipeline projects. This is despite the advice of many reputed agencies including IEA and its own Central Electricity Authority to the contrary. Sri Lanka is increasing its dependence on non-sovereign gas and oil. Small countries like Bangladesh and Nepal are also going ahead with Thermal Power Plants against their own environmental policies and Environmental Impact Analysis requirements. The 9th Basic Electricity Plan in RoK still prioritises LNG to compensate for the loss of coal based power. Private companies like POSCO and Samsung are going ahead with thermal power plants emboldened by GCCS & KEPCO assurance of safeguarding private companies from incurring losses should they incur additional expenses in constructing or operating thermal power plants. Increased power privatization also leads to increased costs for people and conflicts directly with SDG7. People and herder families continue to be adversely affected due to unabated mining in Mongolia. Mining provides approximately one-third of revenues to the government in Mongolia with 80-90% of revenue from mining coming from the same top 10 companies every year.

As far as another critical area in mitigation forests is concerned, the policies in Asia and Pacific countries lead to similar results and policy conflicts. While all the countries talk about increasing forest cover, halting and reversing deforestation; in practice, many countries are taking actions to the contrary. India and Sri Lanka have conveniently revised the definition of forests to include plantations. This has the effect of giving an appearance that forest cover is increasing while in fact natural forests are being lost. India has been engaged in the last couple of years to increase government control over the forests and dilute conservation standards so that it has almost zero rejection rate for forest clearance for any proposal for industry, infrastructure or any other economic activity. Similarly, Sri Lanka is also seeking to divert forest for non-forest purposes. In Sri Lanka pandemic also facilitated land grabbing due to reduced monitoring and policies to stop the import of cattle feed. Deforestation has not declined significantly in Indonesia despite having a moratorium on deforestation and signing a pledge in COP 26 to protect forests and halt and reverse deforestation by 2030.
PEOPLE’S PARTICIPATION

The region has a poor record on the people’s participation in policy making. With climate action and SDGs it is getting worse. While many countries mention the participation of the stakeholders in their NDCs, they fail to provide more explicit information on how their inputs were incorporated in the NDC development. However, case studies affirm that in a large number of countries there was no public consultation in the NDC development or climate action and responses. Similarly, stakeholders are also unaware of public consultations being held while planning or implementing the SDGs or while preparing the VNRs.

In Kiribati, people have very little on the climate change policy manifesting that they might not have been involved in any communication/consultation etc. In Sri Lanka, a large number of environmental defenders protested against a government notification intending to free forest for non forest use by withdrawing protection by labelling them “other forest.” India and Philippines have seen large number of activists, forest and environmental defenders being terrorized and slapped with charges of being anti national. In the Philippines, environmental or forest defenders are hounded by the anti Terrorism Act while ancestral land of the indigenous populations are being parcelled away en masse. In Bangladesh, 8,000 farmers and fisher families are threatened with dislocation due to Rampal Thermal Power Project close biggest wetland and Ramsar protected site of Sunderbans. Mongolia does not have any mechanism for people’s participation in the NDCs. In Indonesia too, despite the promise to return ancestral land to the indigenous population, more of small farmers and plantation workers are facing dispossession. In Thailand, a large number of women (farmers) are being left behind in social protection benefits including universal health coverage and contesting government claims that all Thais are covered.
POLICY COHERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE ACTION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC.

THE POTENTIAL FOR SUBSTANTIAL NDC SDG SYNERGY.
INTRODUCTION

With less than eight years remaining to achieve the objectives of Agenda 2030, no country is on track to meet all 17 SDGs. Countries are also far behind in achieving the low-carbon and climate-resilient society envisioned in the Paris Agreement; their climate pledges, or NDCs, are far less ambitious than required to keep global warming to the Paris target of “well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels (UNEP 2019).

The goals of the NDCs intersect both positively and negatively with the SDGs. Progress on climate goals can therefore either help or hinder progress on the SDGs (Brandi et al. 2017; Dzebo et al. 2019). The success of both can be helped by policy coherence, wherein countries promote synergies and address conflicts in the implementation of both their NDC and SDG agendas.

GENERAL MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION CONTRIBUTION IN ASIA

All 25 countries in Asia communicated a mitigation contribution in their NDC, 19 of which (76%) set a greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) target and six (24%) qualify their contribution in terms of “Action-only.” At the sub-regional level, countries communicated a mix of GHG targets and “Action-only” as their respective mitigation contribution, with the exception of Eastern Asia with all countries setting a GHG target. Figure 1 illustrates the shares of countries with a mitigation contribution, at the regional and sub-regional level, by type of contribution.
The majority of countries in the region (79%) express their GHG target as an absolute reduction of net emissions, while four countries express the reduction in terms of emission intensity per unit of GDP. Around three-fourths (74%) set their target in comparison to the level of emissions under a business as usual (BAU) scenario, and the remaining countries (26%) set their GHG target against emissions from a specific base year.

The timeline of the contributions vary between 2016 and 2035, with the majority of countries specifying an implementation period between 2020/21 and 2030. One country sets an end date of 2035. Around 85 percent of countries in the region include the agriculture sector and almost 90% include the LULUCF sector in their general mitigation contributions. Figure 2 illustrates the share of countries, at the regional and sub-regional level, with IPCC sectors included in their general mitigation contributions, by sector.
Adaptation to climate change refers to changes in processes, practices and structures to moderate potential damages from climate change, or to benefit from opportunities associated with such changes.

Amongst cross-sectoral priorities for adaptation, water is promoted most frequently (83% of countries with an adaptation component), followed by oceans and coastal zones (54% of countries), biodiversity (33%), ecosystems and natural resources (29%) land and soil (13%). Figure 3 illustrates the share of countries with an adaptation component, at the regional and sub-regional level, with cross-sectoral priorities in ecosystems, by type.

Countries often identify a number of cross-cutting priorities in social systems as part of their adaptation strategy. Health represents the most frequently promoted cross-cutting adaptation measure in social systems amongst countries in the region (79% of countries with an adaptation component), followed by Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) (54%), food security and nutrition and resilient infrastructure (42%, respectively). Gender equality and poverty and inequality reduction are included to a comparable degree (17% each). The distribution of priorities at the sub-regional level reflects regional trends, with indigenous peoples and human rights specific to adaptation in South-eastern Asia. Figure 4 illustrates the share of countries with an adaptation component, at the regional and sub-regional level, with cross-cutting priorities in social systems by type.
All countries in Asia, with the exception of one, 56 communicated an adaptation component, all of which include the agriculture and land use sectors. The level of detail included in each country’s adaptation component varies, as some countries detailed their adaptation visions, goals and measures, while other countries made reference to national adaptation and climate justice plans. The majority of countries include a set of priority sector(s) and measures in the agriculture and land use sectors (96% of countries with adaptation) and two countries only include measures. Figure 6 illustrates the share of countries with an adaptation component and adaptation in the agriculture and land use sectors, by type.

**INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE**

Ninety-two percent of countries with an adaptation component include measures related to institutions and governance. The majority of those countries promote DRR/M (67% of countries with adaptation in social systems), followed by policy mainstreaming and coherence (42%), institutional capacity building for climate action (33%) and water governance, law and regulation reform and participatory governance and inclusion to a comparable extent (13 to 17%), amongst others. Figure 5 illustrates the share of countries, at the regional and sub-regional level, with one or more (to avoid bias of representation) institutions and governance-related adaptation measure out of countries with adaptation measures in social systems, by intervention option.
Countries highlight that access to additional financial resources is a prerequisite for achieving the climate goals and targets in country NDCs. All developing countries, with the exception of one\textsuperscript{16}, indicate whether they require full, partial or no financial support for NDC implementation, but not all quantify the respective conditional and unconditional share. Eighty percent of countries in Asia communicate that NDC implementation is partly conditional to international financial support, two countries\textsuperscript{17} make their NDCs totally conditional and two country\textsuperscript{18} make their NDC unconditional to the provision of external finance. Not all requiring financial support however, quantify financial needs disaggregated by conditional and unconditional shares. Only 16\% of countries specify the conditional and unconditional share. Overall, NDC implementation in Asia is associated with a reported 1.6 billion USD. This however represents the financial needs expressed by only one-third of the countries in the region.
SHARE OF COUNTRIES WITH NDCS THAT ARE FULLY, PARTIALLY OR NOT CONDITIONAL TO THE PROVISION OF EXTERNAL FINANCE

The Paris Agreement’s success depends on parties’ implementation of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) towards the Paris Agreement’s goals. In these climate action plans, most developing countries make their mitigation and adaptation contributions conditional upon receiving international support (finance, technology transfer and/or capacity building).

While provision of support for NDC implementation could enhance equity among countries, the feasibility of NDC implementation might be challenged by the large number of conditional NDCs.

We find that feasibility is challenged because conditions applied to NDCs are often not well defined. Moreover, the costs of implementing all conditional contributions are too high to be covered by existing promises of support from developed countries, even if the entire annual $100 billion of climate finance were earmarked for NDC implementation. Consistent with principles of equity and the prioritization in the Paris Agreement, a higher proportion of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have conditional NDCs than do other countries.
NDC SDG COHERENCE IN SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES.

BANGLADESH, INDIA, NEPAL, PAKISTAN AND SRI LANKA.
INTRODUCTION

The study is based on the review of revised NDCs of the five countries in south Asia. It does not explore linkages in other policy documents. South Asia is one of the most vulnerable regions in the world with as many countries in the region figure in the top 10 in the Climate Change Risk Index. With high poverty and high population density many countries have substantial populations dependent on climate change sensitive sectors (agriculture, fisheries, livestock, forests and tourism etc.). A World Bank study noted that 50% population of South Asia has suffered from at least one natural disaster in the last two decades. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka has suffered from severe floods in very recent past as well as severe heat waves in India and Pakistan. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are affected by rising sea levels. For Nepal and India glacier melting has intensified in recent years. Besides rapid and extensive climate change impacts, Covid-19 pandemic has also challenged countries’ capacity to reach the SDGs.

South Asia countries display a variety in policy coherence for the SDGs, some vouching for deeper policy coherence while some show coherence at a very rudimentary level. NDC themselves show differences in approach, structure, balance between mitigation and adaptation and commitment to move towards low carbon production pathways. However, the overall analysis shows that while some countries are at an advanced level of planning and implementing policy coherence at least between the nationally determined contributions and sustainable development goals, some are yet to take off. However, to expect smaller countries to take rapid and swift steps towards coherence would be unrealistic due to their constrained capacity to plan, finance, implement and deliver coherence due to poverty and low resilience, high vulnerability and exposure to disaster and extreme weather events, lack of appropriate technology, finance and technical capacity. These needs can be met with domestic resources and capacity only to a very small extent, in the absence policy coherence at the global level with predatory trade practices and hegemonic neoliberal instruments like Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) robbing developing countries off vital resources that could have been used for effective Covid-19 recovery, efficient climate change response, or holistic sustainable development priorities. Therefore, this snap study aims to look only at their readiness for creating policy coherence for sustainable development. It does not explore the questions of appropriateness and ambition of the NDCs and their gaps either.
BANGLADESH

Revised NDC of Bangladesh commits (i) reduce 6.37% emissions unconditionally and 21.85% conditionally in three sectors of power, industry and transport. The revised NDC also extends the coverage of the NDC to the sectors of energy, industrial processes and products use (IPPU), (ii) agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU), (iii) waste. Bangladesh spends around USD 1 billion (6-7%) of its annual budget on adaptation. However, WB estimates adaptation investment requirements is five times more.

Bangladesh is still preparing its national Adaptation Plan. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP, 2009) includes 44 programmes under six areas, including food security, social protection and health, disaster management, Infrastructure development, research and knowledge management, mitigation and low carbon development, capacity building and institutional development and Major adaptation actions. In addition, adaptation plan is also taking considerations of sustainable ecosystem and livelihood (mainly sustainable forest management and livelihoods), disaster management (tidal areas management by improving embankments, engaging communities to cope up with cc, EWS), Ag & Food (ag tech programme, community based fisheries, LS development, agro-industrial value chain), water resources management (drainage management, CSA water management, reviving small rivers etc.) and surface water and rain water harvesting. It remains to be seen how these important considerations are factored in the Adaptation Plan and up to what measure.

However, CSOs lament that NDC development process did not undertake consultations with them and only Ministries, agencies, academia and media was allowed in the consultations and provided inputs. Also, a quick look at the NDC reveals that there is no information on institutional structure, or on information disclosure mechanism.
India's NDC commits to (i) reducing its emission intensity by 33%-35% by 2030 over the 2005 baseline, (ii) to achieve 40% cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil based energy, and (iii) to create an additional sink of 2.5 -3 billion tons of CO2 equivalent by 2030. It also lays down a requirement of USD 2.5 billion for achieving its NDC. The mitigation will cost USD 834 billion, while adaptation measures will require USD 206 billion.

The priority sectors listed in the NDC comprise of (i) clean tech in thermal, (ii) renewable energy, (iii) emissions from Transportation, (iv) energy efficiency (including in Industries, transport, building and appliances), (v) waste, (vi) infrastructure, (vii) afforestation and (viii) enhancing climate resilience, (ix), and (x. Additional sectors for adaptation are listed as, (i) health, (ii) waste to energy, (iii) coastal areas, (iv) water, and (v) agriculture, (vi) disaster management, (vii ) rural livelihoods, (viii) biodiversity and the Himalayan Ecosystem.

The NDC mentions that India wants to achieve SDGs, but does not talk about coherence of climate action under NDCs with the SDGs. However, the adaptation sectors actions touch several SDGs including SDG1, SDG 2, SDG3, SDG6, SDG8, SDG 9, SDG 11, SDG14 and SDG 15 besides SDG 7 and SDG 13.

The NDC does not give any information on how the NDC was developed and whether stakeholders were consulted. No information on institutional structure or whether there are any efforts for policy coherence. The NDC also lacks information on monitoring mechanisms; however, it may be presumed that NDCs will be updated every five years as required by the PA. The NDC does not give any details on how the NDC will be implemented.
NEPAL

Nepal is a least developed country (LDC) with per capita GDP of USD 1,085. Agriculture and remittance are major contributors to the economy besides tourism. Their latest multidimensional poverty index (MPI) report shows that 28% of Nepal’s population is below MPI. Nepal’s NDC commits to (i) increase energy generation from 1400 MW to 15000 MW (5000MW being unconditional) by 2030 (ii) by 2030 ensure that 15% of the total energy demand is met by renewable energy, and (iii) 25 EV in the new sales by 2025. Revised NDC is more ambitious both in terms of sectoral coverage and net emission reduction. Nepal also put a financial requirement for USD 25 B for mitigation.

Key mitigation areas (i) energy and transport, (ii) IPPU, (iii) agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) and (iv) waste.

Nepal claims to have decreased deforestation rate by 0.05% from about 0.44% and 0.18% in the terai and chure respectively with a target of -0.5% by 2030 apart from equipping every household in rural areas with smokeless (improved) 450,000 cooking stoves by 203021. Mitigation areas also touch a lot of SDGs especially under forestry, agriculture, waste, tourism and urban settlements, and also promote action on GESI. The National Adaptation Plan of Nepal is still being finalized but priority areas include Agriculture and food security, forests, BD and watershed conservation, water resources and energy, rural and urban settlements, industry, transport and physical infrastructure, tourism, natural and cultural heritage, health drinking water and sanitation, and disaster risk reduction and management.

Nepal’s is the only South Asian country which in its NDC, talks about 50% women’s in forest management committees, proportional representation for IPs and Dalits in key positions in the SFM, budget provision to ensure social and environmental safeguards, FPIC, forest tenure, access to finance and technology for local communities, women and IP, fair and equitable benefit sharing (carbon and non-carbon) among LCs, women and IPs. The CSOs also agree to the fact that the NDC development process has also been democratic involving both national and provincial level involving LCs, women, IPs and the youth.
PAKISTAN

Pakistan has been the 8th most disaster affected country during 2000-2019. It is among the top 10 countries in risk index. More than 30 million have been affected by extreme weather events since 2010. The economic costs of floods is approximately USD 3.32 billion per year. Pakistan spends 11% of its budget on adaptation and mitigation. Agriculture is the main economic sector contributing 19% to the GDP, 68% people rely on agriculture for livelihood in rural areas and provides employment to 45% of the national labour force.

Pakistan’s NDC commits to (i) 50% reduction in projected emissions (15% unconditional, 35% conditional), (ii) 60 RE by 2030, and 30% EVs, and (iii) completely ban imported coal, moratorium on new thermal power plants. Pakistan also puts a price tag of USD 101 billion only for energy transition.

Main programmes cited are Ten Billion Tree Tsunami Programme (TBTTP) and Billion Trees Afforestation Programme (will reduce 500 Mt of carbon by 2040), Recharge Pakistan and Protected Areas Initiative. Current emission of Pakistan is measured at 489.84 Mt co2e. it claims to have reduced its emission by 8.7% between 2016-2018. Key mitigation areas include, (i) RE, (ii) transportation, and (iii) coal. Adaptation areas include (recharge Pakistan, Protected Areas Initiative (increase total protected areas from 12% to 15%). The adaptation areas focus specifically on (i) agriculture, (ii) water, (iii) health, and (iv) disaster preparedness. The NDC also puts emphasis on gender equality and youth participation. Its NDC also puts a lot of emphasis on NBS and Financial instruments.

SDGs have been specifically mentioned in the NDCs. NDC says that the SDG support units have been established for integration of climate change measures into national and provincial policies, strategies and planning. However, no more details are available. One specific challenge in policy coherence is cited with regard to the SDG 13, where it says “SDG 13 reinforces the implementation of all but also challenge targets of several SDGs.”
SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka, despite its low emissions has achieved high human development. The country has low poverty rate 4.1% (down from 28% in 2000) and its unemployment rate is also low but recently unemployment has been rising among educated youth. Women have higher educational attainment. Per capita emission is low at 1.02 tons and its contribution in global emissions is only 0.03%

Sri Lanka’s NDC commits to (i) reducing GHG emission by 14.5% from BAU by 2030 (4.5% unconditional and 10% conditional), (ii) achieve 70% RE in electricity generation. (iii) increase forest cover from 29.5% to 32%, (iv) carbon neutrality in electricity generation by 2050 and carbon neutrality by 2060. Key sectors in mitigation are (i) electricity/power, (ii) transport, (iii) industry, (iv) waste management, (v) forestry, and (vi) agriculture and livestock. It’s surprising that there is no financial estimate in the NDCs. It simply reveals that there is not yet a deep systematic analysis inputting costs to each action.

Key adaptation sectors include (i) Agriculture, (ii) fisheries, (iii) Livestock, (iv) water, (v) biodiversity, (vi) coastal and marine, (Vii) health, (viii) Urban planning and human settlement, and (iix) tourism and recreation.

As far as NDC SDG synergy is concerned, there is a chapter on integrating SDGs and Gender to the NDCs. Sri Lanka has used SCAN Tool for policy coherence analysis. Analysis found over 270 linkages, majority being positive interactions. NDC also lays down strong positive interlinkages with SDG7, SDG 8, SDG9, SDG 11, and trade off or mixed interaction with SDG1 and SDG15. Power sector NDCs are shown to have trade offs with SDG 1,2,3,6 and 14. The NDC presents a good analysis of the NDC SDG synergy. However, it fails to detail how this positive interaction will be reinforced and how conflicts will be removed.
NDC AND SDG COHERENCE IN SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES.

VIETNAM, THAILAND, INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES.
INTRODUCTION

Within the Southeast Asian region, the threat of climate change is increasing rapidly. Droughts and floods affected 13.1 million hectares of croplands in the region and about 20.6 million tons of crop production was lost between 2015 and 2019. Numerous studies in the region have suggested that both inland and marine fishery production have started declining because of climate variation and climate-induced disasters. Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand have been identified as among the most affected by impacts of weather-related loss events from 1999 to 2018, according to the Global Climate Risk Index 2020. IPCC AR6 warns that Southeast Asia will be hit by rising sea levels, heat waves, drought, and more intense and frequent bouts of rain. Heavy rain events will intensify by 7% for each degree of global warming.

The increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather disasters as a result of climate change is having a devastating effect on food security and livelihoods. This warning was issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which played a galvanizing role in the inclusion of agriculture in global climate change negotiations and in linking agriculture to National Adaptation Plans and NDCs, in a report. Dominant systems of agriculture and food production including associated land use is a big contributor to climate change along with deforestation, altogether comprising almost a third of global greenhouse gas emissions. Decarbonizing food production and promoting sustainable agriculture and agroecology should be at the core of addressing interlinked challenges between food security/food sovereignty and climate change.

It has been found that sea levels are rising faster in Southeast Asia than elsewhere. Huge swaths of land are closer to sea level across the region than previously realized. Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines, which are highly vulnerable to sea level rise and with land prone to sinking due to subsidence, will face annual extreme sea level events that are progressively getting worse due to climate change. An estimated 15 million people in Asia’s seven biggest cities will live in areas at risk from rising sea levels by 2030. Bangkok will be the hardest hit, with 10 million people and 96% of the city’s GDP at risk from flooding. Parts of Jakarta, coastal home to 10 million people, could be submerged completely. Parts of Manila in the Philippines could be immersed in floodwater. New elevation measures also show that climate change could quickly swamp the Mekong Delta. This will affect 12 million Vietnamese in the next 50 years.

Researchers have predicted a decrease in rice production throughout Southeast Asia as massive floods and droughts become recurring events and saltwater intrusion intensifies. Vietnam’s rice production could be reduced by 3 million tons in the coming decades as a result of flooding. Large parts of the Mekong River Delta, where rice is grown by farmers in Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, may be inundated by sea level rise as a result of warming seas.

The IPCC and another study predict that a one-meter rise in sea level could result in Vietnam losing 7% of its agricultural land, Myanmar seeing a decline in rice yield, and Malaysia suffering damage to 180,000 hectares of agricultural land.
VIETNAM

Vietnam is one of the world’s top five most vulnerable countries to climate change, ranking 13th highest among 180 countries by the Germanwatch Global Climate Risk Index for 2000-19. The national preparation capacity in coping with extreme events, hotter temperatures, and rising sea levels is also poor, ranking 91 of 192 by the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Readiness Index. The country’s rapid economic growth over the past three decades has been fuelled by a coal-dependent energy supply that creates significant GHG emissions. Vietnam announced at the 2021 United Nations COP26 a target of net zero carbon emissions (GHG) by 2050. To deliver this target, Vietnam is reviewing and updating its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).

The Government of Vietnam released Decree 06 on January 7, 2022, providing regulations on the reduction of GHG emissions and protecting the ozone layer, and has issued the country’s National Climate Change Strategy to 2050 in July 2022. Vietnam’s NDC has been developed with the participation and contributions from different line ministries, non-governmental organisations, research institutions, business sector representatives as well as international development partners. Apparently there is a strong supporting legal framework for implementing NDC actions in Vietnam. However, several gaps and challenges remain, including technical capacity, coordination and resource allocation, downscaling to the provinces, genuine engagement of private sector and NGOs and community-based groups, and regulatory framework, all of which is critical to NDC implementation.

Vietnam’s NDC includes a mitigation and an adaptation component. The mitigation component includes both unconditional and conditional contributions. The unconditional contributions are measures that will be implemented using domestic resources, while the conditional contributions are measures that could be implemented if new and additional international financial support, technology transfer and capacity building are received. This conditionality reflects the dependency of the government plan on international financial support. Viet Nam has actively been researching and implementing GHG mitigation measures. Under mitigation component, renewable energy, agriculture projects account for highest share followed by waste treatment and reforestation and afforestation among the total operational projects in the country.
Vietnam’s NDC identifies the GHG reduction pathway in the 2021-2030 period. With domestic resources GHG emissions will be reduced by 8% by 2030 compared to the Business as Usual scenario (BAU). The above-mentioned contribution could be increased up to 25% with international support. Under adaptation component, “Pro-actively responding to climate change, enhancing natural resource management and environmental protection” have been stressed. Vietnam believes that climate change adaptation must be linked to sustainable development and the transition towards a low-carbon economy, and to ensure a systematic, joint, interdisciplinary, inter-regional approach, and incorporate gender equality, hunger eradication and poverty reduction.

The adaptation component identifies adaptation gaps in terms of institutional and policy arrangements (lack of integrating legal framework for climate change issues into national Socio-Economic Development Plans is still limited; apart from ineffective coordination between line ministries, sectors and localities to address multi-sectoral and inter-regional issues; a lack of incentives to attract domestic and foreign investment and to mobilise the private sector to participate in climate change adaptation.), financing, human resource capacity and technology and prioritized adaptation measures for the 2021-2030 period. It is estimated that the national budget will be able to meet approximately one third of the financial needs to implement adaptation measures in this period, and will seek international support and private sector investment for the remainder. The cost of adaptation is estimated to exceed 3-5% of GDP by 2030. The Vietnam Country Climate and Development Report 2022 highlights the need of creating synergies between development and environmental objectives and navigating the (un)intended negative consequences of climate actions from falling onto the poor and most vulnerable groups.

Vietnam has determined that the climate change adaptation must be linked to sustainable development and the transition towards a low-carbon economy, and to ensure a systematic, joint, interdisciplinary, inter-regional approach, and incorporate gender equality, hunger eradication and poverty reduction. Climate change adaptation must be linked to sustainable development and the transition towards a low-carbon economy, and to ensure a systematic, joint, interdisciplinary, inter-regional approach, and incorporate gender equality, hunger eradication and poverty reduction26.
THAILAND

Thailand is one of the most vulnerable countries in SEA due to its long coastal area and its highly dependence on climate patterns for its agricultural activities. Women and communities are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts, especially those in the Lower Northern Region of Thailand (LNRT) where the region is suitable for growing rice and other agricultural crops. Communities earn their living and maintain their livelihoods from agricultural and farming practices and agricultural and farming activities are the main source of their income. Considering the issue of climate justice, these women and communities are having long and extensive experiences in extreme and climate-induced events like heat and droughts and changing climate patterns as these changes are affecting their crops in the farms.

Thailand NDC and the National 25-Year Master Plan on Climate Justice

The discussion around NDC in Thailand has been around mitigation --energy and forest issues, while adaptation is not equally addressed. Adaptation is site specific and needs to engage the local communities to avoid mal-adaptation and false solutions --where there seems to be climate solutions, they might create another problem or violate human/community rights or destroy ecological services communities are depending upon.

The current NDC does not address human rights, women and gender and the different needs and socio-economic and livelihoods of those who are vulnerable to impacts of climate change. Take for example, droughts are addressed but the adaptation to droughts can be varied and there has always been a tradition of solving droughts by constructing a large dam that is not contributing to communities’ resilience building and enhanced adaptive capacity. As far as climate justice and historical responsibility is concerned, the NDC does not address climate justice issues from developed countries --how adaptation and loss and damage due to climate change will be financed. It is very likely that adaptation and mitigation will be financed by the government’s budget which also raises a question if it will be competing with or compromising other community development needs e.g. education, social welfare, health services, etc.
The NDC was revised and submitted to the UNFCCC in October 2020, without consultation with CSOs and women, taking the opportunity of the Covid-19 pandemic and lockdown. The substance in the NDC very much remains the same. Similarly, the National 25-Year Master Plan on Climate Change, at the draft final stage, is gender blind (Climate Watch Thailand, 2019) --not a single word on women or gender in this 105-page draft document. CSOs have made comments on this and at the current stage it has included women as one of the vulnerable groups, despite the fact that women are an agent of change and have implemented different initiatives to cope with climate impacts. The same as in NDC, the Master Plan does not address climate justice issues and means to monitor and hold developed countries accountable to their historical responsibilities.

**INDONESIA**

Indonesia's NDC outlines the country's transition to a low carbon and climate resilience future. The NDC describes the enhanced actions and the necessary enabling environment during the 2015-2019 period that will lay the foundation for more ambitious goals beyond 2020, contributing to the concerted effort to prevent 20 celsius increase in global average temperature and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5o celsius above pre-industrial levels. For 2020 and beyond, Indonesia envisions achieving archipelagic climate resilience as a result of comprehensive adaptation and mitigation programmes and disaster risk reduction strategies. Indonesia has set ambitious goals for sustainability related to production and consumption of food, water, and energy. These goals will be achieved by supporting empowerment and capacity building, improved provision of basic services in health and education, technological innovation, and sustainable natural resource management, in compliance with principles of good governance.

Post 2020, Indonesia envisions a progression beyond its existing commitment to emission reductions. Based on the country's most recent emissions level assessment, Indonesia has set unconditional reduction target of 29% and conditional reduction target up to 41 % of the business as usual scenario by 203027.
Indonesia has set a goal in updated NDC and formulates a long-term strategy on low carbon and climate resilience, committing to reducing GHG emissions by 29% unconditionally and up to 41% conditionally from the business as usual (BAU) emission by 2030. For the adaptation action plans, the government of Indonesia has developed the National Action Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change (RAN-API) to build economic, livelihood, and environmental service resilience. According to official documents, although Indonesia has gradually strengthened its climate commitments and established emission reduction pathways and targets for each sector, its ambitions are still insufficient to reach the Paris Agreement. Indonesia even directly states that they required financial, technology and capacity building needs support to meet the targets. For the mitigation part, we can see that the deforestation in Indonesia has not significantly declined since the moratorium on deforestation is without strict enforcement mechanisms. For the adaptation part, the progress level seems to be not enough, especially in ecosystem-based adaptation (IPCC AR6 WGII). There is still a lack of specific implementation strategies and plans for the goals of adaptation and resilience building.

Indonesia is also prepared to carry out the mitigation efforts especially in the land use sector that includes social forestry through active participation of the private sector, small and medium enterprises, civil society organizations, local communities and the most vulnerable groups, especially adat communities (Indonesia: Masyarakat Hukum Adat, internationally known as Indigenous People), and women—the planning and implementation stages, apart from its focus on clean and renewable energy, waste management for GHG reduction.

The adaptation policy is yet to be finalised but the medium-term goal of Indonesia’s climate change adaptation strategy is to reduce risks on all development sectors (agriculture, water, energy security, forestry, maritime and fisheries, health, public service, infrastructure, and urban system) by 2030 through local capacity strengthening, improved knowledge management, convergent policy on climate change adaptation and disaster risks reduction, and application of adaptive technology.

The preparation of the NDC has taken into account the Post-2015 SDGs particularly on taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, promoting food security and sustainable agriculture, achieving gender equality, ensuring the availability and sustainable management of water, access to affordable, reliable, and renewable energy for all, sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, resilient infrastructure, sustainable consumption and production patterns, conservation and sustainable use of the oceans, seas and marine resources, and protecting, restoring and promoting sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably managing forests, combating desertification, and halting and reversing land degradation and biodiversity loss. The preparation and development of NDC also included multi-stakeholder consultations including civil society, academia, private sector through workshops and consultations at province and national level.

Following article 3.4 UNFCCC Handbook, Indonesia has integrated its policies related to mitigation and adaptation into the national development planning, including National Medium-Term Development Planning (RPJMN 2020-2024) and Indonesia Vision 2045 (Visi Indonesia 2045).

In order to strengthen climate financing, Indonesia has established a national agency for environmental fund management (Id. Badan Pengelola Dana Lingkungan Hidup/BPDLH). BPDLH is mandated to manage and mobilize finance for environment and allowed to mobilize climate finance from various sources both national and international sources, private and public sources, bilateral and multilateral channels. Since its establishment in October 2019, BPDLH has managed reforestation fund from domestic sources (forest levy paid by private sectors) and initiated REDD+ result-based payment from international sources apart from ‘Carbon pricing’ under preparation.
THE PHILIPPINES

In the Philippines, agriculture, forestry and fishing account for a large proportion of the country’s GDP and contribute to job creation and reduced inequality, but these sectors are also significant contributors to overfishing, deforestation, soil erosion, and carbon emissions\textsuperscript{30}

Goals related to economic growth and sustainable consumption and production also come with conflicts. Our analysis found that a switch to sustainable energy sources could conflict with economic growth and raises concerns of increased poverty and inequality. The country plans to construct more than 10 gigawatts (GW) of coal-fired power plants by 2025 under its Coal Roadmap 2017-2040. This unsustainable production is incoherent with the emissions reductions planned in the country’s NDC. Again, poverty, equity and inequality shape synergies and conflicts for example, in the Philippines, climate goals interact with employment needs, particularly those of more marginalized populations. Green job creation for marginalized populations could help minimize equity conflict and facilitate a just transition away from fossil fuels.

Mitigation
The country’s climate change mitigation actions shall strengthen the resilience and adaptive capacity of the country, including through enhanced access to climate finance from the official budget, technology development and transfer, and capacity building, especially on the implementation of the policies and measures on and the uptake of circular economy and sustainable consumption and production practices.

Adaptation
The National Climate Change Action Plan 2011 - 2028 established the seven thematic areas of government action to address climate justice, namely food security, water sufficiency, ecological and environmental stability, human security, climate-smart industries and services, sustainable energy, and knowledge and capacity development, which are pursued coherently with the SDGs and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction\textsuperscript{31}. 
NDC AND SDG COHERENCE IN NORTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES.

TAIWAN, MONGOLIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
INTRODUCTION

Climate justice has been a salient issue for the countries of Northeast Asia in terms of impacts, adaptation, and mitigation. Preliminary analyses suggest that the costs of coastal protection are likely to be the largest adaptation costs across sectors in the region. In infrastructure, Mongolia will probably have the largest adaptation costs in percentage terms. In the PRC, there is a large ‘adaptation deficit’ to extreme events (e.g., flooding and cyclones) in the infrastructure sector that should be addressed now. There is a large mitigation potential in Northeast Asia - at least 7 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2030. Furthermore, much of the potential is at negative cost. That is, they are economically justified regardless of their emission benefits. Regional cooperation is important as it can help reduce the total costs of implementing mitigation in Northeast Asia. If PRC fails to realise its mitigation goals, global mean annual temperature will almost certainly exceed 20°C.

The formation of a common development idea and vision for this sub-region is particularly challenging. Compared with Europe and some other sub-regions in Asia and the Pacific, this sub-region is characterized by complicated political and security situations, prominent historical issues, major differences in social systems and ideology, and multilevel economic development, among other such issues. In addition, these countries have taken different development paths, and are characterized by very diverse levels of economic development. In general, a sense of sub-regional identity is absent in the ENEA sub-region. All these elements thus make it difficult to establish a cohesive regional approach to solving shared regional problems. In addition, localization of Sustainable Development Goals at the national and sub-regional levels poses another challenge for the ENEA sub-region. Achievement of the Goals at the national level – tailored to suit respective national circumstances – is key to achieving those Goals globally. In view of the uneven economic development and different economic systems in the sub-region, these countries have different levels of understanding and interpretation of sustainable development priorities and approaches.

Countries in this sub-region have differing priorities in their national plans and strategies, with varying degrees of association and alignment with the SDGs. Some countries have aligned their national plans with those Goals. Others, even without explicit reference to the Goals, have many elements in their plans and strategies which are consistent with the achievement of the SDGs.
TAIWAN

In 2010, Taiwan set up a task force to "plan and promote climate change adaptation policy guidelines and action programs," jointly develop the National Communication Adaptation Strategy to Climate Change in Taiwan and construct a framework for promoting adaptation in Taiwan. Referring to the future situation and research results of climate change in Taiwan discussed in the 2011 Taiwan Climate Change Science Report, as well as to the adaptation actions taken by various countries and the particularity and historical experience of Taiwan’s environment, the Adaptation Strategy to Climate Change in Taiwan which was approved by the Executive Yuan in 2012 divided national adaptation into eight areas that are most seriously affected: disasters, infrastructure, water resources, land use, coastal zones, energy supply and industry, agricultural production and biodiversity, and health. To put the adaptation strategy into action, eight working groups are set up under the Organization of the National Adaptation Policy Framework to assist in planning and promoting adaptation-related work, which have been compiled with the National Climate Change Adaptation Action Plan (2013-2017) by the National Development Council (NDC).

MONGOLIA

Mongolia is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change impacts. Mongolia Voluntary National Review Report 2019 describes long-term impacts of climate change. Mongolia’s annual average temperature has increased by 2.24 C over the last 70 years. The number of cold days has fallen by 15 days and hot days have increased by 24 days for the last 45 years.

Number of policies has been adopted to address the impacts of climate change such as National Action Programme on Climate Change to be implemented from 2011 to 2021; Green development policy of Mongolia, 2014; State policy on food and agricultural sector, 2010; State policy on forest, 2015; Law on renewable energy, 2015; Law on energy, 2015; State policy on the energy sector of Mongolia, 2015 etc.
These and other relevant national level policy documents served as a basis for the development of Mongolia’s INDC submitted in 2016. In its INDC, Mongolia has outlined a series of policies and measures that the country commits to implement up to 2030, in the energy, industry, agriculture and waste sectors. The expected mitigation impact of these policies and measures was a 14% reduction in total national GHG emissions excluding Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) by 2030, compared to the projected emissions under a business as usual scenario. However, according to the Environmental Performance Reviews conducted in 2017 implementation of the measures foreseen is not yet started. Furthermore, although adaptation components have been included in the main strategic documents on climate change, no strategy or national adaptation plan has been approved to date of the review. Unfortunately, no data is available on the progress so far on the relevant SDG 13.2 target.

In 2020 Mongolia submitted an updated NDC to the UNFCCC. Mongolia sets a new target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 22.7% by 2030, compared to the BAU scenario. This new mitigation target is an improvement on a 14% goal from its earlier intended NDC. It is based on new baseline emissions that Mongolia re-calculated, which are estimated to reach 74.3 MtCO2eq, compared to its 2015 intended NDC baseline of 51.3 MtCO2eq.

The updated NDC includes additional sectors. In the energy sector, Mongolia intends to increase the use of renewable energy sources and improve efficiency of energy production and plans to switch from truck to rail transport of its coal export. Adaptation targets include: implementing sustainable forest management (SFM) and sustainable use of water and pasture land; enhancing the disaster prevention system against drought; enabling adaptation opportunities for vulnerable biodiversity; and building resilience to natural disasters by reducing the risks and adapting to impacts of climate and weather-related hazards and disasters. The NDC builds on existing national development policies as well as newly adopted long-term policy: Vision-2050.
However, according to the WWF assessment of Mongolia’s 2020 NDC, Mongolia’s rating grade was not satisfactory. This assessment was made in comparison to 2016 NDC of Mongolia and shown in the table below. From this table it is clear that only two components of Mongolia’s 2020 NDC: Adaptation and Fostering systemic change are on right track or marked as “NDC We want”.

The alarming status is with the component: Inclusiveness and Participation. In this regard, WWF assessment states the fact that although the 2016 NDC mentions an inclusive process to invite inputs for the NDC design, the updated 2020 NDC does not make any reference to such a process. Both NDCs do not provide details about disclosure of information and do not provide information related to reporting back on processes. The 2016 NDC briefly mentions Ministries that should be engaged as part of the climate governance, the updated 2020 NDC makes no reference to governance structures. Overall rating grade is that Mongolia is: SOME WAY TO GO!

Based on this assessment it can be concluded that Mongolia fails completely in relation to Inclusiveness and Participation in terms of: a) inclusive process in design; b) disclosure of information; c) reporting back on process; d) participatory climate governance structure on 2020 NDC. As for participation in actions against climate change the NDC document does not provide with necessary information on how to track on the progress, where to find progress report and what a structure or focal point to approach with questions and demands to.

Cases of policy incoherence and conflicts

Mongolian people have been observing policy incoherencies causing conflicts at national and sub-national levels and between sectors because of lack of established mechanisms to prevent from policy incoherence causing conflicts. Policy incoherence or policy conflicts in sector policies, such as minerals policies, policies on environment protection and herders livelihood have been very clear for the last two decades of mining developments in the country as the policies and regulations have been approved without proper consultations with local governments, local communities, environmental specialists and others.

As of January 31, 2022 there are 2,641 licenses held by 1,719 companies operating country wide. Out of 2,641 licenses 1,751 licenses are for exploitation and 890 are for exploration according to the statistics of the Minerals Authority of Mongolia. Main minerals for extraction are coked coal, gold and copper. The mining sector accounted for 26.13% of Mongolia’s national budget revenue during 2019. According to the EITI Mongolia data for the last 10 years annually shows that 80-90% of mining revenue have been collected from same 10 top companies.
Korea’s rate of increase in GHG per capita has been the highest among the OECD member countries. Korea’s per capita emissions are 1.85 times the G20 average. The total per capita emissions increased by 3% between 2013 and 2018. Korea is identified as one of the worst climate action performers along with Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Kazakhstan according to the Climate Change Performance Index 2021. In June 2015, the Korean government submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which stated to reduce the emissions by 37% from the BAU-based emission (851 million tons) by 2030. However, the government changed the target four years later based on the absolute emissions methodology. Accordingly, the government updated the 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). Then in 2021, it declared carbon neutrality by 2050 and legislated carbon neutrality. While these are a significant progress, these measures came largely in response to the strong advocacy by civil society groups like the Korea Climate Crisis Emergency Network – a host organization to more than 300 grassroots organizations – which played a central role in pressurizing the government to assess and improve its climate policy. After the Korean National Assembly ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016, the government integrated K-SDGs, which reflects the economic, social and environmental context of Korea, into the National Strategy for Sustainable Development. The Climate Action, no.13 of the K-SDGs, aims to reduce 24.4% of the emissions from 2017 levels.

In contrast to the declared promises written into legislation and strategy for the GHG emissions reductions, the Korean government permitted the construction of new coal-fired power plants and even promoted construction of new airports in controversial sites, exacerbating the ongoing climate and ecological breakdown.

The Carbon Neutrality Commission submitted to the UN at the end of 2021 the 2030 NDC target of reducing 40% of the emissions by 2030 below from 2018 levels. However, 40% reduction of emissions in 2030 is the same as 34% reduction from 2010 levels. Given that the IPCC recommended that global emissions need to be cut by more than 45% by 2030 from 2010 levels to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5 C, Korea’s 2030 NDC target is not aligned with the 1.5 C goal.
Climate Adaptation

The Korean government released last year its third and quinquennial 2021-2025 National Climate Change Adaptation Plan. The Adaptation Plan targets eight fields including responses to flood, drought, wildfires, food sovereignty, and protecting people from infectious disease.45 The Korean government, by implementing the Adaptation Plan as a mandatory and legal obligation for every municipal and local government to follow, received a score of its adaptation measures well above the G20 average.46 However, the government’s commitment to adaptation becomes questionable when the Plan is looked at closely. In the food and agriculture sector, the adaptation measures cover only limited aspects like the provision of services for alarming extreme weather events, improvement of the existing insurance system, and development of climate-resilient crops. It also leaves out the biggest issue of the low self-sufficiency rate of grain and food, which are 21% and 47%, respectively.
Climate Finance

Korea has tripled its funds for climate action over the past five years. In 2019, Korea committed USD 1 billion of its bilateral allocable ODA to the projects that counter climate change. The funds that the government made a pledge to contribute was above the OECD countries average. Climate change is included in The Framework Act on International Development Cooperation. The government committed to contribute USD 5 million to the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in support of developing climate projects in low and middle-income countries. It has also made a voluntary contribution of USD 11.3 million in total to the GGGI and Global Environment Facility Since 1995. However, not unlike other developed countries, Korea’s funds tend to focus on climate mitigation projects. Mitigation takes up 73.9%, leaving little room for the adaptation funds.

SOUTH KOREA’S BILATERAL ODA FOR CLIMATE BY TYPE OF INTERVENTION (USD 1,027 MILLION IN TOTAL, WWW.DONORTRACKER.ORG)
NDC AND SDG COHERENCE IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES.

KAZAKHSTAN AND UZBEKISTAN.
INTRODUCTION

Central Asia provides examples of turning climate change challenges into concrete opportunities for climate action and sustainable development, and this was communicated during the COP 26 where these five countries spoke about their approach to decarbonization and create new opportunities for sustainable growth and the wellbeing of future generations.

The region is collectively yet to develop a roadmap on adaptation with a particular focus on water resources looking at the scarcity of water resource apart from a concrete action and approach on climate action transparency. Some common approaches to maximize climate action in the region and beyond are following:

- long term low-carbon strategies,
- the development of renewable energies,
- phasing out coal and gas,
- sustainable and low-carbon agriculture,
- reducing water consumption, and
- using waste as a source of energy and bio-waste as a fertilizer.

Central Asia’s green climate fund (GCF) projects between 2015 and 2020 account for only 4% of the overall GCF approved portfolio. There’s room for improving those figures and attracting more funds in a strategic region like Central Asia. Concrete regional support would allow National Designated Authorities (NDA) of Central Asia to deliver successful project proposals under the GCF umbrella on both national and regional levels. The momentum is favorable for attracting international partners and donors to work together on sustainable ideas to promote a green recovery post-pandemic on the one hand, and on the other, increase the region’s climate resilience and stability.
KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan’s NDC enhancement is supported through collaborative efforts with the Partnership for Market Readiness under the World Bank, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The World Bank in Kazakhstan is supporting a Mitigation Roadmap until 2025, which includes the required activities to reduce GHG emissions, while GIZ is supporting the development of a low-emission development strategy. IRENA to conduct an assessment of the socio-economic impacts of achieving an energy transition in Kazakhstan, including impacts on GDP and jobs; develop policy measures needed to maximize the benefits of such a transition; and support a just transition, including policies on labour, education, industry and training and reskilling.

Recognizing the importance of preserving the future climate, Kazakhstan has proposed as its unconditional NDC an overall reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 15% by 2030 compared to 1990 level and the conditional NDC of 25% by 2030. Kazakhstan ratified the Paris Agreement in November 2016 and committed itself to meeting the proposed target as the first NDC. The goal will be to contribute to sustainable economic development, as well as to the long-term global goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C. Kazakhstan has also launched an online platform for monitoring, reporting and verification of emission sources and greenhouse gases. This inventory is an essential part of Kazakhstan’s national emissions trading system.

The objective of Kazakhstan’s NDC is to support sustainable economic development, achieve the OECD’s countries level of life quality, and enter the path of low-carbon green development, as well as to contribute to the achievement of the long-term global climate goal.
Mitigation Sectors
Energy, agriculture, waste, land use, LULUCF

Monitoring and Transparency
- Develop GHG emission inventory methodologies for the sectors covered in the GHG emission control system;
- Create a legal framework for the national GHG inventory system;
- Provide trainings on the GHG emission inventory for experts, including experts from business enterprises;
- Improve inter-agency coordination of GHG emissions inventory; and
- Build capacity of participants of the national GHG inventory system for data collection and processing.

Adaptation Component for NDC
- Create adaptation-related measures and policies for the updated NDC based on vulnerability assessment;
- Develop a roadmap for the implementation of adaptation-related NDC components; and
- Raise public awareness on climate change adaptation.

Awareness Raising for Climate Justice
- Offer expert assistance for preparing Kazakhstan delegation for international meetings on climate justice; and
- Facilitate dissemination of key takeaways of national and international events.

Kazakhstan has been listed among the ten countries with insufficient NDC. Furthermore, the country has highly carbon intensive energy systems that steadily increase GHG emissions, which are the reasons for the low progress in reaching the NDC targets. Recent forecasts demonstrate that at the current rate of GHG emissions growth and with the adopted and planned measures and policies Kazakhstan’s NDC target till 2030 will not be achieved with 45 million tons of CO2 equivalent over 52

The Green Economy Concept
The political will of Kazakhstan to transition towards Green Economy is best of all reflected by the Green Economy Concept which is monitored and coordinated by the Special Council on Green Economy under the President (the Green Council) and is chaired by the Prime Minister. The main priorities for the transition to Green Economy are:

- Effective water management;
- Modernization of agriculture;
- Energy saving and energy efficiency improvement;
- Energy Development;
- Waste management;
- Air pollution reduction
UZBEKISTAN

The Republic of Uzbekistan submitted its revised NDC in October 2021. The Republic of Uzbekistan set a target of reducing specific greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP by 35% below 2010 levels by 2030. This is an increase compared to the first NDC which included a target of 10%. The revised NDC also strengthens adaptation measures, particularly in agriculture. The country is also working to align its NDC with its Strategy for Transition to Green Economy by 2030.

Adaptation and Resilience areas in the NDC, until 2030

- Adaptation in water management
- Adaptation in agriculture
- Climate adaptation of social sphere
- Mitigating the Aral Sea disaster
- Ecosystem adaptation
- Adaptation of strategic infrastructure and production facilities

Under climate action, Uzbekistan prioritizes mitigation and adaptation to climate change (including under the Paris Agreement) with a special focus on the Aral Sea region, conservation and the efficient use of water, land and energy resources, as well as biodiversity conservation (SDG 13, 14 and 15)53.

In its NDCs to the Paris Agreement, Uzbekistan identified key climate change adaptation measures in agriculture, natural resources, and infrastructure. They include (i) introducing and scaling up modernized agricultural methods and technologies that are more productive and resilient to the impacts of climate change and variability; (ii) restoring degraded land and improving the management of water resources to ensure sustainable and efficient use of resources with better drought resilience; (iii) modernizing, constructing, and maintaining climate-resilient irrigation, water supply, and other infrastructure that is more resilient to extreme weather events; and (iv) conserving and restoring livelihoods and ecosystems the Aral Sea Basin54.

Government measures to increase the share of renewable energy sources for stable energy supply of the population

According to the Ministry of Energy of Uzbekistan, over the past 5 years, daily electricity consumption in the country has increased by 44.3%. With a fast-rising population of 34 million and a growing economy, the government expects demand for power to rise by over 100 TWh by 2030, a significant increase from 61 TWh in 2018. At the same time, energy resources produce a significant part of greenhouse emissions in the country.

In this regard, Uzbekistan takes concrete measures for the transition to a green economy in the near future, including the development of renewable energy sources (RES). According to expert estimates, the gross potential of RES in the country is at approximately 51 billion toe, technical at 179 million toe. More than 99% of the gross RES potential relates to solar energy. In recent years, Uzbekistan has accelerated relevant policy reforms and approved key acts for the transition to a green economy.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
Policy coherence has received due importance in the Agenda 2030, and has been enshrined as an important indicator (SDG 17.4). The indicator suggests that implementation of the SDGs should have synergy (among the SDGs) and other development and sectoral policies of the countries. However, policy coherence for sustainable development goals is conspicuous by its absence in Asia and the Pacific region as far as synergy between climate action and SDGs are concerned. NDCs though refer to co benefits of climate action in achieving the SDGs, however, political commitment and leadership is low. As regard to the SDGs countries are on still lower level of accountability as they continue to guide action on the SDGs by policies, which are less likely have as much of clarity as legislated instruments or by their own development programmes. The Asian countries are still struggling with removing barriers in ideas, governance and implementation of climate goals with contrasting sectoral policies.

Many countries are in the process of aligning their NDC commitments (more ambitious) with their national and sectoral policies which are more traditional and focus largely on “economic growth dominant development,” confusing between growth and development. There is lack of clear action plans, timelines, communication strategies, and robust framework for monitoring and evaluation. Lack of synergistic ideas, plan to manage trade-offs and conflicts, institutional fragmentation, and lack of CSOs participation remain major challenges to address. However, for this to happen, it is critical that the developed countries should map the probable impacts of their policies in the global south, substantively reduce such impacts, and address development deficits that these policies might create. They also need to acknowledge the loss & damages already created as a consequence of their policies, and support climate action (mitigation, adaptation, as well as loss and damages) and growth towards a low carbon resilient economy for sustainable development through financial, technical, technological, and capacity building related support.
RECOMMENDATION FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

- **Increase Ambition in the NDCs;** The countries need to show more ambition in their NDCs both in terms of climate action as well as synergy with the SDGs. This can happen only in reciprocity of quick decarbonization of developed/industrialized economies. It is impossible to find increasing synergy between Climate action and SDGs in the absence just and quick climate action in the industrialized economies. However, beyond this synergy will not happen automatically and deep efforts are required to bring policy coherence for sustainable development.

- **Incorporate Adaptation Elements into the NDCs to increase Policy Coherence. Currently the NDCs are dominated more by mitigation actions.** The PCSD approach demands that adaptation components too are given equal emphasis. Especially, SDG1 (poverty), SDG 3 (health), SDG 4 (education), SDG 5 (gender), SDG 8 (decent work), SDG 10 (inequality) SDG 16 (human rights, peace and justice and inclusive institutions) and SDG 17 (development assistance, trade negotiations, and technical & technological support) have very poor reflections in the NDCs. Increased focus on adaptation will bring NDCs closer and synergistic of the Agenda 2030.

- **Ensure Parliamentary Oversight:** The implementation of the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs needs Parliamentary oversight, which currently happens in a very few countries; while NDCs, being legally mandated, get more Parliamentary attention. Therefore, it is critical to engage the Parliaments for a synergized pursuit of the Agenda 2030 too. This would also enhance examination of and action on the policy coherence for sustainable development.
- **Increase the Role of NSOs**: Governments should commission National Statistical Organizations (NSOs) in consultation with broader stakeholder communities to develop PCSD indicators (based on the UNEP indicators) for monitoring the policy coherence between the implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement and of the SDGs in national and subnational policy & decision-making. The national complementary indicators could also align normative frameworks reporting for holistic tracking of transformation as well as a clear view of regressive trends.

- **Ensuring Whole of Society Approach**: Governments should ensure that all levels of society share the responsibility of implementing the National Sustainable Development Strategies, the 2030 Agenda and the NDCs. This would overcome accountability concerns by ensuring that relevant government departments are responsible for implementing highly cross-cutting goals. It should also enable fusion of critical reflection and collaborative action combining multi-actoral and sectoral expertise driving the political will towards synergized collective outcomes of individual countries.

- **Clear PCSD Plan and Roadmap**: Governments should develop a PCSD roadmap with time-bound targets. Governments implementing the 2030 Agenda should commit to achieving policy coherence for sustainable development by creating functioning PCSD governance mechanisms. This will require maintaining PCSD and the SDGs among the top government priorities beyond the electoral cycles. It will call for robust data as well as strong institutions, coordination mechanisms and tools, such as impact assessments, budget systems, and reporting systems to Parliaments. A dedicated PCSD rapporteur should be appointed to promote PCSD between government departments, across the entire government and internationally. Inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and a dedicated unit within the Prime Minister's office could promote PCSD and foster horizontal and vertical coordination. Complementary quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed for PCSD reporting as a collective roadmap responsive to development priorities within and beyond borders.

- **Mechanism for Assessments and Improvements**: Appropriate mechanisms should be established to allow continuous ex-ante and ex-post impact assessments for sustainability to be carried out on all government policy-making, legislation, decision-making, budgetary choices etc.
• **Create Mechanisms for Managing Conflicts:** Robust regulatory/arbitration mechanisms should be established that can adjudicate on trade-offs between different policy interests whenever it has not been possible to identify win-win solutions and synergies. The mechanisms should also be empowered to evaluate and inform multi and bilateral negotiations as well as national policy pursuits. In many policy making contexts this is best done at the level of ‘centre-of-government’ – that is by the prime minister and cabinet or equivalent.

• **Create Awareness:** A positive narrative should be created by governments and other key stakeholders around PCSD by emphasising the great leverage PCSD can have for sustainable development and NDCs by showcasing transferable, up-scalable and promising practices.

• **Avenues for CSO Participation in the Agenda and PCSD:** Effective spaces and mechanisms should be created for civil society organisations and other stakeholders to participate in PCSD discussions, in particular ensuring relevant connections with local communities (and developed countries need to ensure dialogue with local communities in the Global South where their policymaking has clear policy impacts on these communities).

• **Align Domestic and Foreign Policies:** Governments everywhere should adopt a balanced, comprehensive, and integrated approach to sustainable development in both their domestic and foreign policymaking by taking all key dimensions into account and ensuring that social and environmental dimensions are not undermined by economic priorities or by vested interests.

• **Create Knowledge and Insights with Research:** Further research is needed on the kinds of strategies and interventions that could address not only institutional barriers, but also target ideas and interests in order to either enhance policy coherence or ensure goal achievement despite incoherence.
• **Create Mechanisms for Managing Conflicts:** Robust regulatory/arbitration mechanisms should be established that can adjudicate on trade-offs between different policy interests whenever it has not been possible to identify win-win solutions and synergies. The mechanisms should also be empowered to evaluate and inform multi and bi lateral negotiations as well as national policy pursuits. In many policy making contexts this is best done at the level of ‘centre-of-government’ – that is by the prime minister and cabinet or equivalent.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVELS

The countries in the Asia Pacific and especially smaller countries with limited financial and intellectual resources and organizing capacity need strong support in understanding, planning, implementing and analyzing policy coherence. It can be done best at sub-regional and regional levels. However, many needs (and policy incoherence or conflicts) as mentioned before emerge at global level and need to be addressed at appropriate global platforms. In particular, following recommendations can enhance understanding and action at policy coherence at regional and global levels

- **Create space and avenues for PCSD discussion**: Policy coherence is a less discussed and less understood concept. There is an urgent need to position discussions and peer learning on the PCSD and sub-regional and regional spaces. APFSD can take a lead in initiating such discussions and sub-regional and regional forums, which can be followed by incentivizing smaller countries with capacity building support. At global level too viz. the HLPF, a thematic session can be devoted to discussing and highlighting best practices in overcoming barriers and challenges in policy coherence. SDG 16, parallel with SDG 17, should be annually reviewed due to its cross-cutting implications with a decisive bearing on the agenda 2030’s success. Also, regional mechanisms like APFSD outcomes containing local aspirations need adequate formal recognition across global deliberative processes to ensure policy coherence.

- **Other UN Forums as springboards**: As the SDGs and the Agenda 2030 form the core of discussion in addition to climate crisis and its manifestations and management at all UN fora, (viz. UNFCCC, UNCBD, UNCCD, UNEA) a PCSD centered discussion can be a springboard to elevate discussions, understanding and insights on the policy coherence.
• **Create space for discussion at sub regional forums;** Besides sub regional and regional forum on the SDGs, there are a number of sub regional forums like ASEAN, Pacific Island Forum, SAARC to list a few. Development of understanding and approaches and practices can take leaps if these spaces can also open up avenues for similar discussions.

• **Utilize capacity building needs of developing countries;** Capacity building is most often cited critical need in the NDCs of the developing countries. Agencies like UNDP, UN Country offices, UNEP and others can take note of these capacity building avenues and utilize them in developing countries understanding, structures and institutions for creating synergy between climate action and SDGs.

• **Map progress on PCSD;** sub-regions and regions provide best space for peer learning and deep exchange of knowledge, experience, insights, challenges and cutting-edge success factors. It would be extremely helpful if regional commissions of the UN can develop tools for mapping progress towards the PCSD and accompany it with a compendium of best practices on creating the policy coherence on sustainable development.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACRF</td>
<td>ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Adaptation Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFOLU</td>
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<td>ASEAN State of Climate Change Report</td>
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<td>BAU</td>
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<td>BPDLH</td>
<td>Badan Pengelola Dana Lingkungan Hidup (Translation: The Environmental Fund Management Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBDR-RC</td>
<td>common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>Celsius</td>
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<td>CO2</td>
<td>Carbon dioxide</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Conference of the Parties</td>
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</table>
Contact

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